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Abstract
This Article presents one of the first empirical studies of federal religious freedom cases since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Hobby
Lobby. Critics of Hobby Lobby predicted that it would open the floodgates
to a host of novel claims, transforming “religious freedom” from a shield
for protecting religious minorities into a sword for imposing Christian values in the areas of abortion, contraception, and gay rights.
Our study finds that this prediction is unsupported. Instead, we find that
religious freedom cases remain scarce. Successful cases are even scarcer.
Religious minorities remain significantly overrepresented in religious freedom cases; Christians remain significantly underrepresented. And while
there was an uptick of litigation over the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate—culminating in Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of the Poor—
those cases have subsided, and no similar cases have materialized. Courts
continue to weed out weak or insincere religious freedom claims; if anything, religious freedom protections are underenforced.
Our study also highlights three important doctrinal developments in religious freedom jurisprudence. The first is a new circuit split over the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The second is confusion over the relationship between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses that is currently
plaguing litigation over President Trump’s travel ban. The third is a new
path forward for the Supreme Court’s muddled Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
In the old days, religious liberty was mainly about protecting religious
minorities—Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Amish, Native Americans, and
others who were overlooked by an insensitive majority. Today, religious
liberty is mainly about sex—especially Christians who object to abortion,
contraception, and gay rights. Laws like the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) and cases like Hobby Lobby1 and the Little Sisters of the Poor2
have emboldened the Christian majority to wield “religious liberty” as a
sword to take away other people’s rights, rather than a shield to protect religious minorities. And the courts are now being flooded with cases involving
Christians who object to selling flowers, cakes, or photography services for
same-sex weddings.
At least this is a common narrative in the media and some corners of academia.3 But is it accurate?
We wanted to answer this question empirically. So we chose the home
of Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of the Poor—the Tenth Circuit—and, beginning with a database of over 10,000 decisions, examined every religious
freedom decision within that Circuit over the last five (and in some cases
ten) years. We first presented our findings to over 100 federal judges at the
Tenth Circuit Judicial Conference in May 2017. We now expand on those
findings in this article—one of the first empirical studies of the federal “religious liberty docket” since Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of the Poor.4
1

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (“Little Sisters of the Poor”).
3
See, e.g., Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A
Return to Separate but Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 907, 929–30 (2016) (Hobby Lobby “redesigned the terrain for free exercise claims” and “opened the door for increased demands
from private entities for [religious] exemptions . . . with little regard to the problems of
attenuation and harm to third parties.”); Marci A. Hamilton, Hobby Lobby Has Opened a
Minefield of Extreme Religious Liberty, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2015, 1:24 PM),
https://nyti.ms/2vKAjuA (arguing that RFRA is “unconstitutional, unprincipled[,] and a
sword believers gladly wield against nonbelievers”); Louise Melling, ACLU: Why We Can
No Longer Support the Federal ‘Religious Freedom’ Law, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015),
http://wapo.st/1e6WIWI?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.c81f54e607e5 (“While the RFRA may
serve as a shield to protect [religious minorities], it is now often used as a sword to discriminate against women, gay and transgender people and others.”).
4
Several groundbreaking empirical studies predate Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of
the Poor and focus on the religious affiliation of judges or claimants. See Gregory C. Sisk,
Michael Heise, & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking:
An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004) [hereinafter Sisk, Heise & Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking]; Gregory
C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religious Fare in the Courts: Empirical Evidence
from Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1021 (2005) [hereinafter Sisk, How
2
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What we found upends the common narrative. Contrary to predictions
that Hobby Lobby would open the floodgates of religious liberty litigation,
these cases remain scarce, making up only 0.6% of the federal docket. And
contrary to predictions that religious people would be able to wield Hobby
Lobby as a trump card, successful cases are even scarcer: there have been
only five winning issues within the Tenth Circuit in five years (sharia, polygamy, eagle feathers, contraception, and Ten Commandments). Moreover,
despite claims that Christians would be the prime beneficiaries of Hobby
Lobby, religious minorities are significantly overrepresented in the cases
relative to their population, while Christians are significantly underrepresented. And while there was an uptick of RFRA claims challenging the contraception mandate—culminating in Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of the
Poor—those cases have subsided, and no similar cases have materialized.
Courts have had no problem weeding out weak or insincere RFRA claims.
If anything, RFRA has been underenforced. There were no cases involving
a clash between gay rights and religious liberty.5 But there were interesting
Traditional and Minority Religions Fair in the Courts]; Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative
Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93
Cornell L. Rev. 873 (2008); Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial Decision Making: An Empirical Perspective, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 185 (2012); Gregory
C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (2012) [hereinafter Sisk & Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”?]; Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk,
Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371 (2013); Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Muslims and
Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA
L. REV. 231 (2012) [hereinafter Heise & Sisk, Muslims and Religious Liberty].
Others have examined the success rates of free exercise or RFRA claims before Hobby
Lobby. See Amy Adamczyk, John Wibraniec, & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the
Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & STATE 237 (2004);
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L.
REV. 466 (2010).
Three empirical studies postdate Hobby Lobby. One examines the application of strict
scrutiny in free exercise cases from 1990 to 2015. See Caleb C. Wolanek & Heidi Liu, Applying Strict Scrutiny: An Empirical Analysis of Free Exercise Cases, 78 Mont. L. Rev. 275
(2017). Another examines the effect of judges’ religious affiliation in religious liberty cases. See Sepehr Shahshahani & Lawrence J. Liu, Religion and Judging on the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming Dec. 2017), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2971472. The third examines religious exemption requests after
Hobby Lobby and compares them with speech claims. See Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L.
Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied Challenges? A Defense of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2018), available at SSRN.
5
In other jurisdictions, there have been religious liberty cases involving the application
of antidiscrimination laws to individuals who religiously object to participating in a wedding ceremony or similarly expressive events. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
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doctrinal developments under RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Establishment Clause that foreshadow potentially significant changes in religious liberty jurisprudence.
We explore these findings in three parts. After summarizing our methodology (Part I), we first examine the overall number and type of religious
liberty decisions—the “religious liberty docket,” so to speak (Part II). We
find that religious liberty decisions are scarce, that half of all decisions involve prisoners or asylum seekers, and that the contraception mandate produced an anomalous spike in RFRA cases that has now subsided.
Next we examine the religious makeup of religious liberty claimants—
the “religious liberty demographic” (Part III). We find that religious minorities bring a disproportionate share of claims, and that Christians remain statistically underrepresented despite the unusual spike in contraception mandate cases.
Finally, we examine the success and failure of various types of religious
liberty claims (Part IV). We find that successful religious liberty claims are
very rare, that courts have no trouble weeding out weak religious liberty
claims (and may well be underenforcing religious liberty protections), and
that religious liberty cases are almost ten times more likely than other cases
to provoke a dissent. We also highlight several doctrinal developments in
the most interesting cases—such as a new circuit split over Native American use of eagle feathers; confusion over the relationship between the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses that is currently infecting the litigation
over President Trump’s travel ban; and a new path forward for the Supreme
Court’s muddled Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Ultimately, this study shows that the state of religious liberty in the federal courts is far more interesting and nuanced than the conventional narrative would suggest. Religious liberty cases are scarce and often difficult.
But they remain crucial for navigating the difficult boundary between
church and state.
I. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our data set consists of all religious liberty decisions within the Tenth
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, No. 16-111 (S. Ct.) (oral argument scheduled Dec. 5,
2017); Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, No. 17-108 (S. Ct.) (cert petition pending);
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. 13-585 (S. Ct.) (cert denied); Lexington Fayette
Urban Cty. Human Rights Comm’n v. Hands on Originals, Inc., No. 2015-CA-000745MR, 2017 WL 2211381 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017). But those cases have typically been
brought in state court under state or local antidiscrimination laws. There were no similar
cases in any federal court within the Tenth Circuit during our five-year time period.

4
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Circuit over the last five years (2012-2017).6 We chose the Tenth Circuit in
part because it has been the leading edge of the conflict over the contraception mandate—including the locus of the Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of
the Poor cases—and in part because one of us was asked to address religious freedom for an audience of Tenth Circuit federal judges. Although the
Tenth Circuit may not be perfectly representative of the federal courts,7 its
docket provides a broad cross section of cases, and the narrower data set
allows us to take a deeper dive into some of the most difficult and interesting cases. To weed out frivolous claims and non-precedential orders, we
excluded unreported district court decisions, as other scholars have done in
similar studies.8 But we included all reported district court decisions and all
Tenth Circuit decisions (both reported and unreported).
6
The exact dates are from February 25, 2012, to February 24, 2017, inclusive. As discussed in Section II.D, infra, an additional five years of research was conducted for RFRA
claims, providing a data set for RFRA claims from February 25, 2007, to February 24,
2017, inclusive.
7
Several features make the Tenth Circuit an attractive circuit to study. First, during the
relevant timeframe, the Tenth Circuit was closely balanced politically—with 47.4% of active judges appointed by Republican presidents and 52.6% of active judges appointed by
Democratic presidents. (We calculated this by tallying the total number of months served
by active Republican appointees during our timeframe (314) versus the total number of
months served by active Democratic appointees (349).) We do not assume that political
ideology plays a role in religious freedom cases, but some empirical studies have found
that the party of the appointing judge is a statistically significant variable in some religious
freedom cases. See, e.g., Sisk & Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”?, supra note 4. Examining a circuit with an even balance of Republican and Democratic appointees would
reduce any such effect.
Second, during the relevant timeframe, the Tenth Circuit had a fairly typical reversal
rate in the U.S. Supreme Court of 64.7%. (We calculated this by examining all reversals for
October
Terms
2012–2016
as
tallied
by
SCOTUSblog.
http://www.scotusblog.com/reference/stat-pack/.) The highest reversal rate was the Third
Circuit, at 87.5%; the lowest was the First Circuit, at 50%; the average over all circuits was
71.6%. Of course, the reversal rate for all cases does not tell us anything specific about
religious freedom cases, but it is one indicator that the Tenth Circuit is average in its jurisprudence as a whole.
Third, the Tenth Circuit’s religious demographic is similar to the religious demographic of the nation as a whole—with a breakdown of 72% Christian, 3% other religions, and
23% unaffiliated in the Tenth Circuit, compared with 71% Christian, 2% other religions,
and 23% unaffiliated in the nation as a whole. See infra Table 8.
One difference between the Tenth Circuit and the nation as a whole is that the Tenth
Circuit has a higher proportion of Native Americans and members of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) than does the nation as a whole. Thus, we consider
those demographic groups in greater detail in our findings below.
8
See Shahshahani & Liu, supra note 4, at 6 & n.7 (discussing reasons for excluding
unreported decisions); Sisk, Heise & Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking, supra note 4, at 534–39 (same).

2018]

SEX, DRUGS, AND EAGLE FEATHERS

5

To compile this data set, we ran the following searches in Westlaw’s
Tenth Circuit Federal Cases database:
1. adv: “relig!” & DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017), filtered
to include all reported decisions in the district courts and Tenth
Circuit.
2. adv: “relig!” & DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017), filtered
to include all unreported decisions in the Tenth Circuit.
This search yielded 378 results—213 reported decisions and 165 unreported decisions. We reviewed each decision to determine whether it involved at least one of the following types of religious liberty claims: Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Free Speech Clause, Equal Protection Clause, RFRA, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), Title VII, the ministerial exception, religious association, autonomy, and asylum.
Of the original 378 decisions, 118 decisions—80 appellate court decisions and 38 district court decisions—involved at least one live religious
liberty claim.9 We considered a religious liberty claim live if it had not already been resolved at an earlier stage of the case. Thus, a decision that
mentioned that a religious liberty claim had already been resolved earlier in
the case was not included, but a decision that mentioned that the religious
claim had not yet been resolved, even if the court ultimately ruled on a procedural issue or on the merits of another claim, was included. These 118
decisions compose our data set of religious liberty decisions.10
We coded each decision separately, regardless of whether there were
multiple decisions in the same case. The reasons for this are twofold. First,
it allowed us to observe the relative frequency that various religious claims
and religious claimants came before the federal courts, providing a more
complete picture of litigation. Second, it eliminated subjective judgment
calls about how to code a case when there were multiple decisions over the
life of a case (such as a decision on a request for preliminary injunction, an
interlocutory appeal, and a subsequent ruling on remand) or when the same
court issued more than one decision addressing different parts of the case or
addressing the case in different procedural postures.11
9

Of the 372 cases, 54 cases touched on religion-related issues, but did not include a religious claim, and 199 cases only mentioned “religion” or “religious” (or, as one mentioned, “relight”).
10
We analyze this data set, as well as various subsets of it, throughout this Article.
11
An alternative approach would be to code only one decision from each “stage” of
the litigation. Cf. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking, supra note 4, at 552–53. But this approach is not without its drawbacks. Take, for example, a case where a court grants one group of plaintiffs a preliminary injunction against a
regulation, Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Sebelius, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (W.D. Okla.

6
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For each decision, we coded the following variables:
 The court;
 The date;
 Whether the decision was reported or unreported;
 Whether the Tenth Circuit decision was heard en banc;
 Whether the Tenth Circuit decision was unanimous;
 Whether the plaintiff was filing pro se;
 Whether the religious claimant was an individual, prisoner, or
organization;
 What the religious affiliation of the religious claimant was, if
known;
 Whether the decision was an overall win or loss for the religious
claimant;
 What types of religious liberty claims were presented;
 Whether each religious liberty claim was a win or loss; and
 Whether each win or loss was based on the merits of the claim or
on other grounds.
We further explain our coding methodology at appropriate places in the
analysis of our findings below.
II. NUMBER AND TYPE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAIMS
A. Religious liberty cases are relatively scarce.
We first wanted to determine how often religious liberty cases arise as a
percentage of the federal courts’ docket. To do this, we searched within our
target dates for all cases of any kind (all Tenth Circuit decisions, and all reported district court decisions)—yielding a total of 10,025 cases.12 This
2014), but later in the same case grants (or denies) another preliminary injunction to a
broader group of plaintiffs against a different version of the regulation, Catholic Benefits
Ass’n LCA v. Burwell, 81 F. Supp. 3d 126 (W.D. Okla. 2014). It is not at all clear why
either decision should be ignored when both decisions required the court to address the
merits of slightly different religious freedom claims. Thus, coding only one decision from
each level of the litigation risks ignoring valuable information. It also tends to downplay
the extent to which certain types of claims consume more judicial resources (in the form of
more decisions). And it also leaves room for subjective judgments about which of multiple
decisions to code. In our data set, there were approximately five decisions (depending on
one’s definition of a “stage”) that would be eliminated by coding only one decision per
“stage.”
12
We searched all Tenth Circuit decisions for adv: DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-252017), yielding 6,131 cases. We then searched each federal district court within the Tenth
Circuit for adv: DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017), filtered to include only reported
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means that the 118 religious liberty decisions during that time period constitute 1.2% of all decisions. That figure is higher for the Tenth Circuit (1.3%)
than for the district courts (1.0%). This could suggest that religious liberty
decisions are more likely than average to be appealed. Alternatively, because our data set excludes unpublished district court decisions, it could
mean that district courts resolve religious liberty cases more often using unpublished opinions. More on this later. Either way, the 1.2% of decisions
involving any type of religious liberty claim suggests that religious liberty
cases are a fairly small portion of the courts’ docket.13
The paucity of religious liberty decisions is even more apparent when
we consider the prevalence of decisions involving prisoners or asylum
seekers. Of the 118 religious liberty decisions in our data set, 39 (33%) involve cases brought by prisoners and 20 (17%) involve cases brought by
individuals seeking asylum. In other words, half of all religious liberty decisions involved prisoners or asylum seekers.
The vast majority of these cases were unsuccessful. Of the 39 prisoner
cases, 87% were pro se, 87% were unpublished, and 82% were unsuccessful.14 Prisoners tend to bring a high percentage of meritless claims, and the
resolution of those claims often tells us little about federal religious liberty
jurisprudence. Thus, for the remainder of our analysis, we exclude prisoner
cases unless otherwise noted.15
The 20 asylum cases were also largely unsuccessful. All of these cases
were heard by the Tenth Circuit on direct appeals from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) under a very deferential standard of review. Only
cases, yielding 3,894 cases—949 Colorado district court cases, 649 Kansas district court
cases, 785 New Mexico district court cases, 561 Oklahoma district court cases, 556 Utah
district court cases, and 394 Wyoming district court cases.
13
Religious liberty cases are also scarce in comparison with other types of cases. For
example, one study of all federal cases during the three years post Hobby Lobby compared
the volume of speech and expression cases to religious exercise cases, finding that speech
and expression cases outnumber religious claims at a ratio of about 3:1. See Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 4, at Tables 3; cf. id. at Table 1 (Between 1946–2016, the United States
Supreme Court has heard 344 speech and association cases compared to only 29 religious
exercise cases.).
14
There were 7 prisoner decisions that included at least one successful religious claim:
Robertson v. Biby, 647 F. App’x 893 (10th Cir. 2016) (free exercise); Williams v. Wilkinson, 645 F. App’x 692 (10th Cir. 2016) (RLUIPA, free exercise, and equal protection);
Woodstock v. Shaffer, 169 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (D. Colo. 2016) (RLUIPA and free exercise);
Marshall v. Wyoming Dep’t of Corrections, 592 F. App’x 713 (10th Cir. 2014) (free exercise); Tennyson v. Carpenter, 558 F. App’x 813 (10th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA); Yellowbear v.
Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA); McKinley v. Maddox, 493 F. App’x 928
(10th Cir. 2012) (RLUIPA). See infra Section IV.H.
15
For a fuller discussion of religious demographics in prisoner cases, see infra Part
II.C. For a fuller discussion of success rates in prisoner cases, see infra Part IV.H.

8

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

one case resulted in a remand to the BIA—meaning that 95% were unsuccessful. Thus, for similar reasons, we exclude these cases from our analysis
unless otherwise noted.16
Excluding the 59 decisions involving prisoners and asylum seekers
leaves us with a revised data set of 59 religious liberty decisions—23 from
the Tenth Circuit, and 36 from district courts.17 Obviously, these decisions
make up an even smaller portion of the courts’ overall docket: 0.6% of all
cases.18 But now, percentages for the Tenth Circuit and district courts are
reversed: religious liberty decisions make up 0.4% of the Tenth Circuit’s
docket and 0.9% of the district courts’ docket. This suggests that, once we
control for prisoner and asylum cases, religious freedom cases are not more
likely to be appealed than other cases. In fact, they may be less so.
This also means that Tenth Circuit judges hear and decide religious liberty cases infrequently. If we spread the 23 Tenth Circuit decisions across 5
years, 12 active judges, and 7 senior judges, that would mean that a Tenth
Circuit judge, on average, would sit on a panel producing a religious liberty
decision once every 13 months and would author a religious liberty decision
once every 40 months.19
16
For a fuller discussion of religious demographics in asylum cases, see infra Part
II.D. For a fuller discussion of success rates in asylum cases, see infra Part IV.H.
17
Note that 57 out of the 59 decisions we are excluding came from the Tenth Circuit;
only 2 came from the district courts. The breakdown of the remaining district court decisions is as follows: 16 from the District of Colorado (43%); 5 from the Western District of
Oklahoma (14%); 4 from the District of Kansas (11%); 4 from the District of New Mexico
(11%); 4 from the District of Utah (11%); 3 from the District of Wyoming (8%); and 1
from the Northern District of Oklahoma (3%).
18
Excluding 59 prisoner and asylum decisions leaves us with 9,966 total decisions. 59
/ 9,966 = .006.
19
As of early 2017, there were 12 active judges and 7 senior judges on the Tenth Circuit. Judges of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, THE 10TH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS,
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/judges. Assuming a senior judge carries one-half of an active case load, we get the following: 23 decisions * 3 judges per panel / 5 years / 15.5 judges = 0.890 religious liberty panels per judge per year, or 1 panel every 13.5 months
(12/0.890). Assuming a judge authors a decision in one third of her panels yields 1 decision
every 40.4 months. We have not accounted for separate opinions (like concurrences or dissents) or en banc proceedings, which would alter the numbers very slightly toward greater
frequency. During the five years we analyzed, there was one en banc decision and two decisions involving dissents from denial of rehearing en banc. See Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2017) (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 799 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2015) (dissent
from denial of rehearing en banc); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114
(10th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch sat on the Tenth Circuit for over ten years, including the entire time covered by our data set. Judge Neil M. Gorsuch’s U.S. Senate Committee of the
Judiciary Questionnaire for Nominee to the Supreme Court at 2,
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B. The most common claims are RFRA, free exercise,
establishment, and Title VII.
When the courts do eventually decide a religious liberty case, what
types of claims do they resolve? As noted above, half of all religious liberty
decisions involve prisoners or asylum seekers. Prisoners typically raise
claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Asylum seekers invoke the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
But what about the other half of decisions? Table 1 displays a breakdown of the types of claims raised in the remaining 59 decisions. (Because
most decisions involve more than one type of claim, the numbers and percentages add up to more than 59 and 100%, respectively.)20
Table 1. Types of Religious Liberty Claims
Type of Claim
RFRA
Free Exercise Clause
Establishment Clause
Title VII
Free Speech Clause
Equal Protection Clause
Religious Association
RLUIPA
Autonomy
Ministerial Exception

No. Percentage
23
39%
22
37%
19
32%
17
29%
12
20%
7
12%
4
7%
1
2%
0
0%
0
0%

RFRA and free exercise claims are the most common. RFRA claims are
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Neil%20M.%20Gorsuch%20SJQ%20(Pu
blic).pdf. During his tenure, he heard over 2,700 cases, of which 40 (1.5%) touched on religious liberty. Id. at 25, 30–32; Hearing on the Nomination of the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017) (written testimony of Hannah C.
Smith, Senior Counsel, Becket). Of those 40, there were 11 opinions that involved the same
religious claims we looked at and did not involve prisoners or asylum seekers—i.e., 0.4%
of his docket as a whole. This is the same percentage we found during our time period for
the Tenth Circuit as a whole. It means that Judge Gorsuch participated in roughly one religious liberty decision per year.
20
All percentages are rounded to the nearest full percent. Tables that include decimals
use up to two significant digits.
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examined in detail in the next section. RFRA and free exercise are followed
closely by claims under the Establishment Clause and Title VII, and then
more distantly by free speech. There are only a few claims involving equal
protection, religious association, or RLUIPA.
Interestingly, there are no decisions involving land-use claims under
RLUIPA. That does not mean these claims never arise, only that they arise
infrequently and not recently.21 Some commentators have criticized RLUIPA, arguing that it gives religious organizations a “blank check” to challenge local zoning laws and makes it virtually impossible for local zoning
authorities to defend themselves.22 Others (including one of us) have argued
that RLUIPA is modest and underenforced.23 The absence of any RLUIPA
land-use decisions in the last five years would seem to support the latter.
Also interesting is that there have been no ministerial exception cases in
the last five years. The ministerial exception is a constitutional doctrine that
has long barred certain types of employees (those performing important religious functions) from suing their religious employer on certain types of
claims (those that would entangle the courts in religious questions or impose an unwanted leader on a religious organization). In 2012, at the beginning of our data set, the Supreme Court decided its first ministerial exception case, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC.24 At the time, the federal government argued that ruling in favor of
the church would create a slippery slope allowing churches to assert a ministerial exception defense to all sorts of claims in all sorts of circumstances.25 After the Court ruled unanimously for the church, some commentators
criticized the decision on similar grounds.26 But that slippery slope has not
21
There have only been a few RLUIPA land-use cases in the Tenth Circuit. See, e.g.,
Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir.
2010); Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir.
2006); Grace Church of Roaring Fork Valley v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Pitkin Cty., Colo.,
742 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (D. Colo. 2010).
22
See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, The Circus that Is RLUIPA: How the Land-Use Law that
Favors Religious Landowners Is Introducing Chaos into the Local Land Use Process,
FINDLAW (Nov. 30, 2006), http:// writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20061130.html.
23
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and
Under-Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1021 (2012).
24
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). Co-author Goodrich was co-counsel for the church in Hosanna-Tabor.
25
Brief for the Federal Respondent at 44–46, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)
(No. 10-553).
26
See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951 (2012); Leslie C. Griffin, The
Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981 (2013); Mark Strasser, Making the Anomalous
Even More Anomalous: On Hosanna-Tabor, the Ministerial Exception, and the Constitu-
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materialized in the Tenth Circuit. Although courts within the Tenth Circuit
issued four ministerial exception decisions in the ten years before HosannaTabor,27 they have decided none in the five years since.
C. There was a spike in RFRA claims against the contraception mandate.
Because the most common type of religious liberty claim was based on
RFRA, a closer look at RFRA decisions is warranted. Of the 59 decisions
not involving prisoners or asylum seekers, 23 involved a RFRA claim.28 Of
these, 18 (78%) involved the contraception mandate—a federal regulation
requiring employers to cover contraception in their health insurance plan.29
Three (13%) involved Native American access to eagle feathers.30 One
(4%) involved a pro se challenge to the classification of marijuana as a
Schedule I drug.31 And one (4%) involved an attempt to use RFRA as a defense to a prosecution for sending a threatening letter to a doctor training to
provide abortions.32 Table 2 shows this breakdown of the four categories of
RFRA claims.

tion, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 400 (2012).
27
A search for lower court decisions in the Tenth Circuit that mention “ministerial exception,” excluding unreported district court decisions, reveals four ministerial exception
decisions in the ten years preceding Hosanna-Tabor: Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of
Colo., 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002); Braun v. St. Pius X Par., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (N.D.
Okla. 2011); Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Kan. 2004).
28
None of the 39 decisions in prisoner cases or 20 decisions in asylum cases involved
a RFRA claim.
29
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (requiring all group health plans and health insurance issuers that offer non-grandfathered health coverage to provide coverage for certain
preventive services without cost-sharing, including, “[for] women, such additional preventive care and screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the
Health Resources and Services Administration”).
30
U.S. v. Aguilar, 527 F. App’x 808 (10th Cir. 2013) (RFRA defense to killing an eagle and possessing eagle parts); Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Sch, 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159
(N.D. Okla. 2016) (state RFRA claim seeking permission to wear eagle feather at graduation); N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Wyo. 2012) (RFRA challenge
to government refusal to permit eagle take).
31
Krumm v. Holder, 594 F. App’x 497 (10th Cir. 2014).
32
U.S. v. Dillard, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Kan. 2012).
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Table 2. RFRA Claims 2012-2017

Type of Claim
Contraception Mandate
Native American
Drugs
Other
All

No.
18
3
1
1
23

Percentage
78%
13%
4%
4%
100%

We suspected that the large number of contraception mandate cases in
2012-17 was an anomaly. So we conducted a search of all RFRA decisions
over the previous five years: 2007-12.33 That search returned 24 decisions
(10 Tenth Circuit and 14 district court decisions), of which 8 decisions (6
Tenth Circuit and 2 district court decisions) involved a federal or state
RFRA claim.
The RFRA claims in these 8 decisions fall into the same categories we
have previously identified. There were no contraception mandate claims,
because the mandate was not imposed until January 20, 2012.34 But there
were five decisions (63%) involving Native Americans (four involving access to eagle feathers, and one involving objections to an autopsy)35 and
three decisions (38%), in one case, involving the use of drugs.36 Table 3
shows this breakdown of the various categories of RFRA claims for the
previous five years.

33

We searched adv: “religious freedom restoration act” RFRA & DA(aft 02-24-2007
& bef 02-25-2012)—first filtered to include all Tenth Circuit decisions, then filtered to
include all reported district court decisions in the Tenth Circuit.
34
News Release, A statement by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum Servs. (Jan. 20, 2012). The first
lawsuit challenging the mandate was brought on November 10, 2011. See Complaint, Belmont Abby College v. Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 11-1989).
35
United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011) (eagle feathers); Ross v.
Bd. of Regents of The Univ. of N.M., 599 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2010) (autopsy); United
States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008) (eagle feathers); United States v. Hardman,
622 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Utah 2009) (eagle feathers); United States v. Wilgus, 606 F.
Supp. 2d 1308 (D. Utah 2009) (eagle feathers), rev’d, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011).
36
United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Quaintance, 315 F. App’x 711 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Quaintance, 523 F.3d 1144 (10th
Cir. 2008).
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Table 3. RFRA Claims 2007-2012

Type of Claim
Contraception Mandate
Native American
Drugs
Other
All

No.
0
5
3
0
8

Percentage
0%
63%
38%
0%
100%

Combining these 8 RFRA decisions from 2007-2012 with the 23 RFRA
decisions from 2012-2017 provides a new data set comprised of 31 RFRA
decisions.37 This data is summarized in Table 4.
Table 4. RFRA Claims 2007-2017
Type of Claim
Contraception Mandate
Native American
Drugs
Other
All

2007-12
0
5
3
0
8

2012-17 Total
18
18
3
8
1
4
1
1
23
31

Tot. Percent
58%
26%
13%
3%
100%

This table suggests that the contraception mandate cases were an anomaly. Not including the contraception mandate cases, there were only 13
RFRA decisions in 10 years (8 decisions from 2007-2012, and 5 decisions
from 2012-2017). But the contraception mandate cases added another 18
RFRA decisions in 5 years—more than doubling the rate of all other RFRA
decisions combined.
This dynamic must be kept in mind when considering the other aspects
of this study. For example, the five-year surge in contraception mandate
cases significantly affected the overall frequency of religious liberty decisions. With those cases included in the data set, religious liberty decisions
(excluding prisoner and asylum claims) constituted 0.6% of the courts’
docket.38 Without those cases, religious liberty decisions constituted only
0.4% of the courts’ docket.39 The contraception mandate cases also affect
the demographics of religious liberty claimants and the overall success rates
of religious liberty claims, as we explain below.
37

Two decisions involve state RFRAs, both in cases brought by Native Americans.
See Ross, 599 F.3d 1114; Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Sch., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D.
Okla. 2016).
38
59/9,966=0.006.
39
41/9,948=0.004.
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But the RFRA numbers are also interesting in several other respects.
First, aside from contraception mandate cases, the number of RFRA cases is
quite small—only 13 decisions in 10 years. By way of comparison, over the
same 10-year period, there are 109 Tenth Circuit and reported district court
decisions mentioning the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)40—a
statute that receives far less national attention.
Second, the range of RFRA cases is quite narrow. Of the 13 noncontraception decisions, 8 involved Native Americans (7 seeking access to
eagle parts, 1 challenging an autopsy); 4 involved drugs; and 1 was an odd
case involving a threatening letter. This indicates that there is not a wide
range of groups invoking RFRA for a wide range of purposes.
Third, the share of RFRA decisions involving Native Americans is surprisingly high—62% of the non-contraception mandate cases. These decisions present an interesting parallel with the contraception mandate cases.
Specifically, both involve federal laws that directly conflict with widespread practices among specific religious groups—namely, opposition to
facilitating contraception and abortion among Catholics and Protestants, and
the desire to use eagle feathers and eagle parts among Native Americans.
Thus far, the Native American cases within the Tenth Circuit have been
largely unsuccessful. But the Fifth Circuit recently ruled in favor of Native
Americans in an eagle feathers case, expressly relying on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, a contraception mandate case.41 That may
prompt additional challenges in the Tenth Circuit until the law is changed or
the legal questions are definitively resolved.
Finally, the success rate of RFRA claims is sharply divided. Of the 18
RFRA decisions involving the contraception mandate, 10 were successful—
i.e., resolved in favor of the religious claimant. But of the remaining 13
RFRA cases, only 2 were successful and one of those was later reversed by
a Tenth Circuit panel decision.42 We discuss these success rates in more detail in Part IV, infra.
III. DEMOGRAPHICS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAIMANTS
In addition to the frequency and type of religious liberty claims, we con40

We searched adv: “national environmental policy act” & DA(aft 02-24-2007 & bef
02-25-2017)—first filtered to include all Tenth Circuit decisions, then filtered to include all
reported district court decisions in the Tenth Circuit. This returned 54 Tenth Circuit decisions and 55 reported district court decisions.
41
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014).
42
United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (D. Utah 2009), rev’d, 638 F.3d 1274
(10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Utah 2009).
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sidered the identity of religious liberty claimants. In particular, what religious groups are bringing claims? And are they being brought by individuals or groups? Our results show that a disproportionate share of claims are
brought by individual non-Christians. And this finding becomes even more
significant when we control for the contraception mandate cases, which
were brought exclusively by Christians.
A. Methodology
Consistent with prior research, we relied upon the religious selfidentification of each claimant.43 In our data set, religious claimants can be
grouped into four broad categories.
 “Christian”: This group consists of all claimants who selfidentify as Christian—including Catholics, Protestants,44 members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons),45 and Fundamentalist Mormons.46 Those who identified
as Catholic, Protestant, or generically as “Christian” are further
grouped together under the subcategory “Catholic/Protestant.”47
43
Heise & Sisk, Muslims and Religious Liberty, supra note 4, at 247 (citing Pew Research Center’s and Gallup, Inc.’s practice of relying upon self-identification by individuals).
44
Protestants include evangelical, mainline, and historical black protestant groups.
45
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints typically refers to its members as
“Latter-day Saints” or “LDS.” Scott Taylor, LDS or Mormon? It depends, DESERET NEWS
(April 2, 2011), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/700123737/LDS-or-Mormon-Itdepends.html. But the term “Mormon” is more common and is increasingly accepted by
members of the church itself. Id. This Article uses the more common term.
46
We use the term “Fundamentalist Mormon” to include groups that broke with the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints over the issue of polygamy, including the Fundamental Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (FLDS) and the Apostolic United
Brethren Church (AUB).
47
We recognize the labels “Christian” and “Catholic/Protestant” create some difficulties. See Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L. Q.
919, 967 (2004) (acknowledging that “the label of ‘Christian’ is often too simplistic to reflect the reality of American religion”). Because several cases involved a combination of
Catholics and Protestants, and others referred to the religious claimants generically as
“Christian,” we have grouped these in a single subcategory labeled “Catholic/Protestant.”
This eliminates the need to choose between coding a case as either Catholic or Protestant
when both groups were involved, or to create a separate but almost certainly overlapping
category of generic “Christians.”
Other groups also identify as Christian but are not Catholic or Protestant—e.g.,
LDS/Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses, among others. Of those groups, only Mormons
were involved in decisions in our data set. The “Catholic/Protestant” subgrouping also allows us to consider Mormons separately from Catholics and Protestants, which is valuable
because Mormons make up less than 1.6% of the population nationally, Pew Research Cen-
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“Other religions”: This group consists of members of all other
faith traditions—including Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs, Native Americans, and other smaller groups.48
“Non-religious”: This group consists of non-religious claimants
who brought religious liberty claims to challenge the expression
of religion by others, including claims under the Establishment
Clause.
“Unknown”: This group consists of claimants whose religious
affiliation was not disclosed.

B. Religious minorities bring a disproportionate share of claims.
We first consider the 59 religious liberty decisions that did not involve
prisoners or asylum seekers. Table 5 shows the religious demographics of
the claimants in these decisions.49

ter, Religious Landscape Study: Religions (2014), http://www.pewforum.org/religiouslandscape-study/, but a significantly larger percentage of the population in the Tenth Circuit, including 55% of the population in Utah, Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape
Study: Adults in Utah (2014), http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscapestudy/state/utah/, and 9% in Wyoming, Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study:
Adults
in
Wyoming
(2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscapestudy/state/wyoming/.
48
These include Rastafarian, Odinism, Paganism, Nations of Gods and Earth (Black
Muslim Movement), Christian Identity and Christian Separatism, Ever Increasing Faith,
Maharaj Ashutosh, and Moorish Science Temple of America.
49
Again, the numbers add up to more than 59 and more than 100% because some decisions involved multiple claimants from different religious groups.
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Table 5. Religious Claimant Demographics Per Decision

Religious Affiliation
Christian
Catholic/Protestant
Fundamentalist Mormon
Mormon
Total
Other Religions
Muslim
Native American
Hindu
Total
Non-Religious
Unknown

No.

Percentage

25
3
1
29

42%
5%
2%
49%

7
4
2
13
10
7

12%
7%
3%
29%
17%
12%

A few points stand out. First, Catholics and Protestants are the largest
group, with 25 decisions; but they still account for fewer than half of all decisions (42%). The second largest group is the non-religious claimants, with
10 decisions (17%), 7 of which were Establishment Clause challenges.50
The third largest group is Muslims, with 7 decisions (12%), all of which
came in Title VII cases alleging religious employment discrimination.51 The
fourth largest is Native Americans, with 4 decisions (7%), all involving eagle feathers.52 Next are Fundamentalist Mormons, with 3 decisions (7%), 2
50

See Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214, 1215-21 (10th Cir. 2017) (dissent
from denial of rehearing en banc); Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F. 3d 848 (10th Cir.
2016); Fields v. City of Tulsa, 753 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 2014); Am. Humanist Ass’n, Inc.
v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. Re-1, 158 F. Supp. 3d 1123 (D. Colo. 2016); Medina v.
Catholic Health Initiatives, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1190 (D. Colo. 2015); Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 36 F. Supp. 3d 1233 (D.N.M. 2014); United States v. Goxcon-Chagal, 885 F. Supp.
2d 1118 (D.N.M. 2012). The other cases included two Title VII cases where the plaintiff
was suing based on someone else’s religious actions and one RFRA challenge to the drug
classification of marijuana. See Krumm v. Holder, 594 Fed. Appx. 497 (10th Cir. 2014)
(RFRA); Canfield v. Office of the Sec’y of State for Kan., 2016 WL 4528065 (D. Kan.
2016) (Title VII); Didier v. Abbott Labs., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1152 (D. Kan. 2014) (Title VII).
51
See Chawla v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (D. Colo. 2014) (Muslim employee Title VII claim); E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d
1106 (10th Cir. 2013) (same); Kaiser v. Colo. Dep’t of Corrections, 504 Fed. Appx. 739
(10th Cir. 2012) (same); EEOC Comm’n v. JBS USA, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Colo. 2015) (same); E.E.O.C. v. 704 HTL Operating, LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D.N.M.
2013) (same); EEOC v. Jetstream Ground Servs., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (D. Colo.
2015) (same).
52
U.S. v. Aguilar, 527 Fed. Appx. 808 (10th Cir. 2013) (Native American eagle feather case); Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Sch., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla. 2016)
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involving a challenge to Utah’s polygamy law, and 1 involving a church
trust dispute.53 There are 2 cases involving Hindus (5%), both in Title VII
employment disputes.54 And there is 1 case involving Mormons (2%), who
brought Title VII employment and equal protection claims.55
As noted above, however, we are studying an anomalous time period
involving a spate of 18 contraception mandate cases. What if those cases
were excluded? Those results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Religious Claimant Demographics
Excluding Contraception Mandate Decisions
Religious Affiliation
Christian
Catholic/Protestant
Fundamentalist Mormon
Mormon
Total
Other Religions
Muslim
Native American
Hindu
Total
Non-Religious
Unknown

No. Percentage
7
3
1
11

17%
7%
2%
27%

7
4
2
13
10
7

17%
10%
5%
32%
24%
17%

Excluding the contraception mandate cases, the largest single group of
claimants in the religious liberty decisions are the non-religious, at 24%.
Catholics and Protestants are tied for second with Muslims at 17%, despite
the fact that Muslims make up less than 1% of the population.56 Other reli(same); N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (D. Wyo. 2015) (same); N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Wyo. 2012) (same).
53
Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016) (polygamy law challenge); Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, 698 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir.
2012) (church trust dispute); Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013) (polygamy law challenge).
54
Desai v. Panguitch Main St., Inc., 527 Fed. Appx. 689 (10th Cir. 2013); Aluru v.
Anesthesia Consultants, 176 F. Supp. 3d 1116 (D. Colo. 2016).
55
Hunt v. Cent. Consol. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D.N.M. 2013).
56
See Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Colorado (2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/colorado/ (<1% in Colorado);
Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Kansas (2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/kansas/ (1% in Kansas); Pew
Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in New Mexico (2014),
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gions outnumber Catholics and Protestants by almost 2:1 (32% to 17%).
But none of this means very much if we do not know the religious demographics of the Tenth Circuit as a whole. Although the U.S. Census does
not ask about religious affiliation,57 the Pew Research Center conducted a
comprehensive study of the nation’s religious landscape in 2014, the middle
year of our five-year timeframe.58 The results of that study, broken out by
the states of the Tenth Circuit and nationally, is shown in Table 7.

http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/new-mexico/ (<1% in New
Mexico); Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Oklahoma (2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/oklahoma/ (<1% in Oklahoma);
Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Utah (2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/utah/ (1% in Utah); Pew Research Center, Religious Landscape Study: Adults in Wyoming (2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/state/wyoming/ (<1% in Wyoming);
Pew
Research
Center,
Religious
Landscape
Study
(2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/ (0.9% in the United States).
57
See Anne Farris Rosen, A Brief History of Religion and the U.S. Census, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.pewforum.org/2010/01/26/a-brief-history-ofreligion-and-the-u-s-census/ (explaining the history of religion on the U.S. Census).
58
Religious Landscape Study: About the Religious Landscape Study, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (2014), http://www.pewforum.org/about-the-religious-landscape-study/ (conducting a
U.S. Religious Landscape Study based on telephone interviews with more than 35,000
Americans in all 50 states).
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Table 7. Religious Demographics in the
Tenth Circuit States and Nationally59

Religious
Affiliation
Christian
Protestant
Catholic
Mormon
Other
Mormon
Total
Other Religions
Muslim
Hindu
Native
American
Unaffiliated
(Non-Religious)

CO

KS

NM

OK

UT

WY

US

43%
16%
2%

57%
18%
1%

38%
34%
1%

69%
8%
1%

14%
5%
55%

44%
14%
9%

46.6%
20.8%
1.6%

<1%
64%

<1%
76%

1%
75%

<1%
79%

1%
73%

<1% <0.3%
71% 70.6%

< 1%
<1%

1%
<1%

<1%
<1%

<1%
<1%

1%
<1%

<1%
<1%

< 1%

<1%

<1%

<1%

<1%

29%

20%

21%

18%

22%

0.9%
0.7%

1% <0.3%
26%

22.8%

Not surprisingly, Catholics and Protestants are the largest religious
groups in most states. The one exception is Utah, where Mormons are a majority at 55%. The next largest group consists of those who are unaffiliated
with a religion (including atheists, agnostics, and “nothing in particular”),
who make up 18% to 29%.
Using this data, combined with the estimated population for each state
in 2014,60 we can determine the religious demographics of the Tenth Circuit
as a whole.61 Those calculations are reflected in Table 8.

59

All percentages are drawn from the 2014 Pew U.S. Religious Landscape Study. See
supra note 56.
60
The United States Census Bureau estimates state populations per year. For 2014—
the same year the PEW study was conducted—the Tenth Circuit state populations were:
5,349,648 (Colorado); 2,899,360 (Kansas); 2,083,024 (New Mexico); 3,877,499 (Oklahoma); 2,941,836 (Utah); and 583,642 (Wyoming). NATIONAL, STATE, AND PUERTO RICO
COMMONWEALTH TOTALS DATASETS: POPULATION, POPULATION CHANGE, AND ESTIMATED COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2016, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, available at, https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2016/demo/popest/statetotal.html. The total population of the Tenth Circuit states in 2014 was 17,735,009. See id.
61
Multiplying the state population by the percentage of each religious group gave us
the population of each religious group in each state. Adding together each state population
for each religious group and then dividing by the total population, gave us the percentage
each religious group comprised of the total population.
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Table 8. Religious Demographics in the Tenth Circuit and Nationally
Religious Affiliation
Christian
Catholic/Protestant
Mormon
Fundamentalist Mormon
Total
Other Religions
Hindu
Muslim
Native American
Total
Unaffiliated

US

10th Cir.

67.4%
1.6%
<0.3%
70.6%

60%
11%
1%
72%

0.9%
0.7%
<0.3%
1.9%
22.8%

1%
1%
1%
3%
23%

In the Tenth Circuit states, Catholics and Protestants comprise about
7.4% less than the national average, while Mormons comprise about 9.4%
more than the national average. The percentage of other religions and those
who are unaffiliated is on par with the national average.62
Using the religious demographics of the Tenth Circuit as a whole, we
can now determine whether any particular religious demographic is
overrepresented, underrepresented, or accurately represented in their share
of religious liberty decisions as a whole. To do this, we use a number called
the representation ratio.63 For any given group:
% of decisions involving a religious group
representation ratio =

% of religious group as share of population

The representation ratio is a nonnegative number that provides a meaningful measure of the religious group’s descriptive representation.64 A representation ratio of 0 indicates that a group is not represented at all. Ratios
62
The Pew survey listed several religious minorities as “<1%” of the population in the
various Tenth Circuit states. See supra Table 7. Absent more precise data, we rounded each
of these groups up to 1%. This ensures that our representation ratio errs on the side of caution—i.e., understating any degree of overrepresentation of religious minorities (except for
Mormons who have greater than or equal to 1% of the population in each Tenth Circuit
state).
63
Shahshahani & Liu, supra note 4, at 12 (citing PITKIN, HANNA F., THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION (1967)). Of course, out-of-circuit residents could file religious liberty
claims in the Tenth Circuit. But this does not appear to be common.
64
See id.
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below 1 indicate that the group is underrepresented in litigation compared
with its population. A ratio of 1 means that the group’s share of religious
liberty decisions perfectly matches its share of the population as a whole.
Ratios above 1 show that the group is represented in a disproportionately
high share of religious liberty decisions compared with its population.65
Table 9 shows the representation ratio of each religious group in all religious liberty decisions in the Tenth Circuit, excluding prisoner and asylum
cases.
Table 9. Representation Ratio of Religious Claimants Per Decision
Religious Affiliation
Muslim
Native American
Fundamentalist Mormon
Hindu
Non-Religious
Catholic/Protestant
Mormon

Representation Ratio
11.86
6.78
5.08
3.39
0.74
0.70
0.16

This table shows that, as a portion of the total population, Muslims, Native Americans, Fundamentalist Mormons, and Hindus are all overrepresented as a share of religious freedom decisions. Non-religious and Catholics and Protestants are somewhat underrepresented at 0.74 and 0.70, respectively. And Mormons are significantly underrepresented at 0.16.
When we control for the anomalous spate of contraception mandate cases, the differences are even sharper. Table 10 shows the representation ratio
of each religious group when contraception mandate cases (along with prisoner and asylum cases) are excluded.

65

Id.
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Table 10. Representation Ratio of Religious Claimants
Per Non-Contraception Mandate Decisions
Religious Affiliation
Muslim
Native American
Fundamentalist Mormon
Hindu
Non-Religious
Catholic/Protestant
Mormon

Representation Ratio
17.07
9.76
7.32
4.88
1.06
0.28
0.23

Muslims, Native Americans, Fundamentalist Mormons, and Hindus are
even more overrepresented than before. Non-religious claimants are now
almost perfectly represented—although we might have expected them to be
the least represented group, given that we are considering only religious liberty decisions. The representation ratio of Catholics and Protestants dropped
significantly from 0.70 to 0.28. This is not surprising, given that all contraception mandate cases were brought by Catholics or Protestants. Slightly
less represented were Mormons, at 0.23.
These numbers contradict the popular narrative that religious freedom
cases predominantly involve the large Christian groups. This is not true in
absolute terms, as Catholics and Protestants were involved in only 42% of
all religious liberty decisions, and only 17% of decisions when the anomalous contraception mandate cases are excluded. But it is particularly untrue
when considering the religious demographics of the population as a whole,
as Catholics, Protestants, and Mormons are significantly underrepresented,
while non-Christian minorities are significantly overrepresented. This suggests that religious liberty jurisprudence is disproportionately important for
protecting non-Christian religious minorities.
C. Religious minorities predominate in prisoner cases.
Thus far, we have considered the religious demographics in decisions
not involving prisoner or asylum claims. But prisoner and asylum cases also
have interesting religious demographics of their own. Table 11 shows the
religious demographics of claimants in prisoner decisions.
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Table 11. Religious Affiliation of Prisoner Decisions

Religious Affiliation
Christian
Catholic/Protestant
Mormon
Total
Other Religions
Jewish
Muslim
Native American
Christian Identity/Christian Separatism
Nations of Gods and Earth
Ever Increasing Faith
Moorish Science Temple of America
Odinism
Paganism
Rastafarian
Satanist
Total
Unknown

No. Percentage
4
1
5

10%
3%
13%

4
4
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
20
13

10%
10%
8%
5%
5%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
51%
33%

Over half of all prisoner decisions involved non-Christian religious minorities. The most frequently appearing were Muslims, Jews, and Native
Americans. Decisions involving Muslims or Jews often involved challenges
to the denial of religious diets.66 Other decisions involved requests for access to religious worship services, such as a Native American sweat lodge.67
66

See, e.g., Chapman v. Lampert, 555 Fed. Appx. 758 (10th Cir. 2014) (Orthodox
Jewish prisoner requests religious diet); Woodstock v. Shaffer, 169 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (D.
Colo. 2016) (Jewish prisoner requests kosher diet); Williams v. Wilkinson, 645 Fed. Appx.
692 (10th Cir. 2016) (Muslim prisoner requests kosher diet); Miller v. Scott, 592 Fed.
Appx. 747 (10th Cir. 2015) (Muslim prisoner requests halal or kosher diet).
67
See Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014) (Native American prisoner
requests access to sweat lodge for religious ceremonies). Justice Gorsuch identified Yellowbear was one of the ten most significant cases over which he presided when he was a
judge on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. United States S. Comm. on the Judiciary:
Questionnaire for Nominee to the Supreme Court, 115th Cong. 25, 30–31 (2017) (statement of Neil Gorsuch, Circuit J., United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Neil%20M.%20Gorsuch%20SJQ%20(Pu
blic).pdf. In that case, Yellowbear, a Northern Arapaho Native American prisoner sought
use of the prison’s sweat lodge for prayer. 741 F.3d at 51-52. The prison denied his request.
Id. The Tenth Circuit found that under RLUIPA, the denial was a substantial burden on
Yellowbear’s religious exercise and that the prison failed to establish a compelling interest
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Only 10% of prisoner decisions involved Catholics or Protestants—even
less than the 17% that involved Catholics or Protestants in noncontraception mandate cases. Unfortunately, we were unable to calculate a
representation ratio for these decisions, because data on the religious demographics of Tenth Circuit prisons is unavailable.68
D. Christians bring a majority of asylum cases.
Asylum decisions tell a different story. Table 12 shows the religious
demographics of claimants in asylum decisions.69

when it did not quantify the costs associated with granting him access and that denial of
access was not the least restrictive means of accommodating its concerns. Id. at 62–64.
Justice Sonya Sotomayor quoted this opinion in her concurrence in another RLUIPA cases,
Holt v. Hobbs. 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In Holt, an Arkansas inmate Abdul Muhammad was denied the ability to grow a half-inch beard in accordance with his Muslim faith, even though Arkansas already allowed inmates to grow beards
for medical reasons, and Mr. Muhammad’s beard would be permissible in 44 state and federal prison systems across the country. Id. at 859 (majority opinion); Brief for the Petitioner
at 4, Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (No. 13-6827). The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Mr. Muhammad had shown a substantial burden on his religious exercise and
that Arkansas failed to show a compelling interest in prohibiting the beard. 135 S. Ct. at
859. Co-author Goodrich was co-counsel for the plaintiff in Holt.
68
One article reported federal prisoner religious demographics from 2013. See Mona
Chalabi, Are Prisoners Less Likely To Be Atheists?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 12, 2015,
6:07 A.M.), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/are-prisoners-less-likely-to-be-atheists/
(data was obtained through a FOIA request). And a 2012 PEW study conducted a survey of
prison chaplains. See Pew Research Center, Religion in Prisons—A 50 State Survey of
Prison Chaplains (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/2012/03/22/prison-chaplainsexec/. But neither provides accurate data on the religious demographics of prisoners within
the Tenth Circuit as a whole. Interestingly, the PEW survey reported on the likelihood that
various types of accommodations would be granted, finding that requests for religious
books or texts and meetings with leaders from the inmates’ faith are usually approved, requests for special religious diets, items, or clothing are less likely to be approved, and requests for a special hairstyle or grooming are most likely to be denied. Id. It will be interesting to see how those numbers change in light of the Supreme Court’s first RLUIPA decision, Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015), which held that a Muslin prisoner must be
permitted to grow a half-inch beard.
69
The percentages add up to more than 100% because one case, Bwika v. Holder, 527
F. App’x 772, 774 (10th Cir. 2013), involved both Christian and Muslim petitioners.
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Table 12. Religious Affiliation of Asylum Decisions

Religious Affiliation
Christian
Catholic/Protestant
Mormon
Total
Other Religions
Sikh
Hindu
Maharaj Ashutosh
Muslim
Total

No.

Percentage

14
2
16

70%
10%
76%

2
1
1
1
5

10%
5%
5%
5%
24%

The majority of decisions involved Christians (76%). Far fewer involved other religious minorities (24%). But this is not surprising. In the
typical asylum case based on religious persecution, the asylum seeker is a
religious minority in her country of origin. For example, 10 of the 14 decisions involving Catholics or Protestants were brought by citizens of China70
where those groups are a minority71 and where persecution of religious minorities since 2012 has reportedly intensified.72

70

Xue v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2016); Daoi Kai He v. Lynch, 638 Fed.
Appx. 717 (10th Cir. 2016); Binbin He v. Lynch, 607 Fed. Appx. 826 (10th Cir. 2015); Zhe
Sun v. Holder, 607 Fed. Appx. 801 (10th Cir. 2015); Jin Jian Chen v. Lynch, 630 Fed.
Appx. 798 (10th Cir. 2015); Jing Li v. Holder, 607 Fed. Appx. 818 (10th Cir. 2015); Ronghua He v. Holder, 555 Fed. Appx. 786 (10th Cir. 2014); Liying Qiu v. Holder, 576 Fed.
Appx. 855 (10th Cir. 2014); Jin Hua Lin v. Holder, 500 Fed. Appx. 782 (10th Cir. 2012);
Yuan Shan Wu v. Holder, 501 Fed. Appx. 786 (10th Cir. 2012). The other four asylum
decisions involving Catholics or Protestants were brought by citizens of Kenya, Indonesia,
Morocco, and Romania. See Ballad v. Holder, 554 Fed. Appx. 705 (10th Cir. 2014) (Morocco); Adam v. Holder, 576 Fed. Appx. 804 (10th Cir. 2014) (Indonesia); Ilioi v. Holder,
566 Fed. Appx. 652 (10th Cir. 2014) (Romania); Bwika, 527 Fed. Appx. 772 (Kenya).
71
In China, Chinese Buddhists comprise the largest faith group with an estimated 185–
250 million followers. James Griffiths & Matt Rivers, As Atheist China Warms to the Vatican, Religious Persecution “Intensifies”, CNN (last updated Mar. 1, 2017, 9:31 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/28/asia/china-religious-persecution-christianity/index.html.
Christianity is the second largest faith group, with only 72–92 million followers. Id.
72
See, e.g., id. (“Christians, and other believers, have long faced oppression within
China.”); SARAH COOK, THE BATTLE FOR CHINA’S SPIRIT: RELIGIOUS REVIVAL, REPRESSION, AND RESISTANCE UNDER XI JINPING (Annie Bovarian et al. eds,, 2017), available at
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_ChinasSprit2016_FULL_FINAL_140pages
_compressed.pdf (Freedom House report covering religious persecution in China).
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IV. SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAIMS
In addition to the demographics of religious claimants, we wanted to determine what types of religious liberty claims are succeeding on the merits
and what types are failing.
A. Methodology
To analyze success, we first coded each religious liberty decision as either a win or loss. A decision counted as a win if any of the issues in the
decision were resolved in favor of the claimant raising the religious claim.73
It counted as a loss if all of the issues were resolved against the religious
claimant. Then, within the wins and losses we coded each decision as having been resolved on purely procedural grounds or on the merits. Purely
procedural grounds consist of issues like mootness, lack of standing, or failure to exhaust administrative remedies—issues that prevent a court from
opining on the merits of a religious liberty claim. But if a court addressed
the merits of a religious liberty claim in any way, it was coded as a resolution on the merits. Finally, it is important to note that not all decisions on
the merits are created equally. For example, if a court holds that a plaintiff’s
claim survives summary judgment because there are disputed issues of fact,
that is not as significant as a grant of summary judgment in the plaintiff’s
favor. So our coding also considered whether a claim was only “partially”
successful (because it survived a motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment) or fully successful (because the court granted the claimant a preliminary injunction or summary judgment). Using the same system, we also
coded whether each individual religious claim in a decision won or lost on
the merits or on purely procedural grounds.
B. Successful religious liberty claims are rare.
Of the 59 religious liberty decisions excluding prisoners and asylum
seekers, 11 (19%) were resolved on procedural grounds (such as mootness74
or failure to exhaust administrative remedies75)—leaving 48 decisions that
addressed the merits. Of those 48 decisions addressing the merits, there
73

We treated Establishment Clause claims the same way—that is, we coded a decision
as a win if the court resolved any part of the claim in favor of the claimant challenging the
government’s action under the Establishment Clause. This eliminates any value judgments
about how Establishment Clause claims “should” be resolved.
74
Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016).
75
Paige v. Donovan, 511 Fed. Appx. 729 (10th Cir. 2013).
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were 20 wins (42%) and 28 losses (58%). As noted above, however, not all
“wins” are created equally. Of the 20 wins, 5 decisions were only “partial”
victories—i.e., the plaintiffs’ claims survived a motion to dismiss or motion
for summary judgment.76 Fifteen decisions were full victories on the merits—either granting the claimant a preliminary injunction or resolving a
claim entirely in favor of the religious claimant. Thus, if we include partial
victories, religious claimants were successful 42% of the time; if we include
only full victories, claimants were successful 31% of the time.
As noted above, however, we are studying a timeframe involving an unusual spate of 18 contraception mandate decisions. Seventeen of those decisions reached the merits—with 10 ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, and 7
against. That means that the contraception mandate decisions tended to be
more successful than average, raising the overall success rate in religious
liberty decisions. This is due in part to the fact that there were multiple
pending cases that all had to be resolved the same way—in favor of the religious claimant—after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hobby Lobby77
and Little Sisters of the Poor.78 If the contraception mandate decisions are
excluded, the success rate of plaintiffs is lower: 32% if we include partial
victories (10 wins out of 31 decisions) and 16% if we include only full victories (5 wins out of 31 decisions). If we include prisoner and asylum cases,
the success rate would be even lower.79 Other studies have found similarly
low success rates on religious liberty claims.80
The bottom line is that successful religious liberty claims are rare. As
noted in Part II.A, there are not many religious liberty claims to begin with–
76

While such a ruling might eventually lead to a settlement, that is not the same as a
final judgment on the merits.
77
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
78
Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
79
See infra Part IV.H. Prisoners had a success rate of 25% for all victories and 0% for
full victories. Asylum seekers had only 1 partially successful decision out of 20 (5%).
80
For example, Sisk and Heise conducted studies from 1986–1995 and from 1996–
2005 on how judges voted in decisions involving religious claims. For free exercise and
accommodation claims—which includes the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA, RLUIPA, the
Equal Access Act, equal protection, free speech and employment-discrimination claims—
religious claimants were successful at a rate of 35.6% of judicial participation from 1986–
1995, and at a rate of 35.5% from 1996–2005. Sisk & Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty, supra note 4, at 238–39 & n.39; Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religious Fare in
the Courts, supra note 4, at 1025. For Establishment Clause claims, religious claimants
were successful at a rate of 42.3% of judicial participations from 1986–1995, and at a rate
of 39.8% from 1996–2005. Sisk & Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”?, supra note 4, at
1211 & n.42. But there are differences between Sisk and Heise’s studies and ours that
make comparison difficult. For example, they included prisoner cases; we (for present purposes) do not. They also counted each vote of each court of appeals judge separately; we
counted only the overall decision.
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approximately 0.6% of the judicial docket. They are often resolved on purely procedural grounds (19% of the time). When the courts do reach the merits, they decide in favor of the plaintiffs, at most, 42% of the time (including
partial victories and the anomalous spate of contraception mandate cases),
and as little as 16% of the time (excluding partial victories and contraception mandate cases). Thus, at the end of a five-year period encompassing
over 10,000 decisions within the Tenth Circuit, there were only 15 fully
successful religious liberty claims (consisting of 10 contraception mandate
victories and 5 victories in other cases) on five discrete issues—sharia, polygamy, eagle feathers, contraception, and Ten Commandments.
C. Success rates vary by type of claim.
Given the small number of victories, it is easy to consider them in greater depth. Successful claims fall naturally into the following four categories:
 10 victories in contraception mandate (RFRA) decisions;81
 3 victories in Establishment Clause decisions;82
 2 victories in free exercise decisions;83 and
 5 partial victories in Title VII cases.84
We first wanted to consider the success rates of each type of claim. To
do this, we examined only decisions addressing the merits of a claim (either
partially or fully). We then divided the number of successful claims of each

81

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc);
Newland v. Burwell, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1122 (D. Colo. 2015); Armstrong v. Burwell, No. 13cv-00563, 2014 WL 5317354 (D. Colo. 2014); Dobson v. Sebelius, 38 F. Supp. 3d 1245
(D. Colo. 2014); Colorado Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (D. Colo.
2014); Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Burwell, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1269 (W.D. Okla. 2014);
Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v. Sebelius, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (W.D. Okla. 2014); Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012); Armstrong v. Sebelius, 531 Fed.
Appx. 938 (10th Cir. 2013); Newland v. Sebelius, 542 Fed. Appx. 706 (10th Cir. 2013).
82
Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 2016) (striking down Ten
Commandments display); Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 36 F. Supp. 3d 1233 (D.N.M. 2014)
(same); Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (W.D. Okla. 2013) (striking down sharia
ban).
83
N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (D. Wyo. 2015) (eagle feathers);
Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013) (polygamy).
84
Canfield v. Office of the Sec’y of State for Kan., 2016 WL 4528065 (D. Kan. 2016)
(no religion); EEOC v. Jetstream Ground Servs., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (D. Colo.
2015) (Muslim); EEOC v. Jetstream Ground Servs., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (D. Colo.
2015) (Muslim); E.E.O.C. v. 704 HTL Operating, LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D. New
Mexico 2013) (Muslim); Hunt v. Cent. Consol. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D.N.M.
2013) (Mormon).
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type by the total number of claims of that type. The results are reflected in
Table 13.
Table 13. Success Rate of Each Religious Claim
Religious Claim
RFRA
Title VII
Establishment Clause
Free Exercise Clause

Success Rate
48%
33%
29%
20%

This suggests that RFRA claims are most successful, Title VII and Establishment Clause claims are moderately successful, and free exercise
claims are least successful. But given the small sample size and other dynamics, these numbers do not tell the whole story. For example, all 10
RFRA victories came in contraception mandate cases. If contraception
mandate cases are excluded, the 4 remaining RFRA decisions on the merits
were losses—resulting in a success rate of 0%. Furthermore, all 5 Title VII
victories were only partial—i.e., decisions denying a defendants’ motion for
summary judgment or motion to dismiss. If partial victories are excluded,
the 10 remaining Title VII decisions on the merits were all losses—also resulting in a success rate of 0%.
Given the small number of successful religious liberty claims, it is
worth examining them in further detail—and, in some cases, contrasting
them with unsuccessful claims. Thus, in the following sections, we consider, in turn, each type of successful claim: RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause,
the Establishment Clause, and Title VII. We then offer brief thoughts on
prisoner and asylum cases, and we conclude by considering what we call
“divisive” religious liberty decisions—i.e., those that prompted dissent.
D. RFRA
1. Contraception Mandate (“Sex”)
As noted above, there were 10 successful RFRA decisions, all involving
the contraception mandate. This seems like a very large number, given that
there were only 10 other victories overall (5 partial victories in Title VII
cases, and 5 total victories in other cases).
But a few considerations put this number in perspective. First, the 10
successful decisions came in only 6 separate cases. That is because several
cases generated multiple decisions. For example, in Newland v. Sebelius,
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there was a district court decision granting a preliminary injunction,85 a
Tenth Circuit decision affirming the preliminary injunction in light of Hobby Lobby,86 and then another district court decision entering a permanent
injunction.87 Although some non-contraception mandate cases also generated multiple decisions, this happened significantly more often in contraception mandate cases.
Second, 4 of the 10 favorable decisions were simply “clean up” decisions following Hobby Lobby—that is, once the Tenth Circuit (or Supreme
Court) resolved Hobby Lobby, the pending cases presenting the same issue
were resolved the same way.88
Finally, the 10 favorable decisions in 6 separate contraception mandate
cases were also balanced by 7 losses in 5 separate contraception mandate
cases.89 Although these losses were eventually turned into wins (or ultimately will be) by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hobby Lobby and Little
Sisters of the Poor, they show that contraception mandate cases were far
from a uniform success before the Supreme Court weighed in.
Perhaps even more interesting than the successful contraception mandate cases are the contraception mandate cases (and other RFRA cases) that
were never filed. When the Supreme Court decided Hobby Lobby, the government and the dissent predicted “a flood of religious objections regarding
a wide variety of medical procedures and drugs,”90 such as “blood transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications
derived from pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated
with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among others).”91 They also predicted that corporations
would bring a rash of RFRA challenges outside the healthcare context.92

85

881 F. Supp. 2d 1287.
542 F. App’x 706.
87
Newland v. Burwell, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1122 (D. Colo. 2015).
88
Armstrong v. Burwell, 13-cv-00563-RBJ, 2014 WL 5317354 (D. Colo. Sept. 29,
2014); Newland, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1122; Newland, 542 F. App’x 706; Armstrong v. Sebelius,
531 F. App’x 938 (10th Cir. 2013).
89
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colo. v. Burwell, 794 F.3d
1151 (10th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2012
WL 6930302 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012); Ass’n of Christian Sch. Int’l v. Burwell, 75 F.
Supp. 3d 1284 (D. Colo. 2014); Diocese of Cheyenne v. Sebelius, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1215 (D.
Wyo. 2014); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1225
(D. Colo. 2013); Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Colo. 2013); Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
90
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014).
91
Id. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
92
Id. at 2804–05.
86
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Several commentators made similar predictions.93
But these challenges have not materialized. Our data set extends through
February 24, 2017—thirty-two months after the Supreme Court’s decision
in Hobby Lobby.94 During that time, there have been no RFRA challenges
in the Tenth Circuit to any other medical procedures or drugs. Nor have
there been any new RFRA challenges by for-profit corporations—or any
organization for that matter. In fact, there have been only two new RFRA
decisions at all—one involving a pro se individual’s attempt to legalize marijuana,95 and one involving a Native American request to wear an eagle
feather at a high school graduation.96 Both were unsuccessful. By contrast,
in the thirty-two months after HHS promulgated the contraception mandate,
the courts in the Tenth Circuit had already decided 12 of the 18 contraception mandate decisions in our data set. So there has already been ample time
for the “flood” of new religious objections; it simply has not materialized.97
2. Drugs
Examining unsuccessful RFRA claims also shows that courts can draw
sensible lines when applying RFRA. Two of those cases involved possession of drugs. First, in United States v. Quaintance,98 drug smugglers pled
guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, but
raised a RFRA defense, alleging that they were the founding members of
the “Church of Cognizance,” which taught that marijuana is a deity and sacrament. Then-Judge Gorsuch, writing for the Tenth Circuit, rejected the
93
See, e.g., Martin S. Lederman, Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy of Religious Freedom Restoration, 125 YALE L.J.F. 416, 419 (2016) (“[T]here is widespread fear
in some quarters—and presumably hope in others—that such claims might become a template for similar claims, pursuant to federal or state RFRAs or analogous state constitutional provisions, for religious exemptions from laws that prohibit discrimination in employment, or in the provision of public accommodations, on the basis of sexual orientation.”);
Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV.
J. L. & GENDER 35, 98 (2015) (“Might [RFRAs] now be construed to protect religiously
motivated employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, or discrimination by
wedding vendors, merchants in other contexts, or government officials against same-sex
couples?”).
94
The Supreme Court decided Hobby Lobby on June 30, 2014. 134 S. Ct. 2751.
95
Krumm v. Holder, 594 F. App’x 497 (10th Cir. 2014).
96
Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Sch., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla. 2016) (Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act).
97
Cf. Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 4 (finding that a comparison of federal cases involving a RFRA claim pre- and post-Hobby Lobby showed no significant drop in government win rates).
98
608 F.3d 717 (10th Cir. 2010) (Gorsuch, J.).
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claim, finding that the purported religious beliefs were not sincere.99
Similarly, in Krumm v. Holder,100 the plaintiff brought a RFRA claim
challenging the classification of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance, alleging that the classification violated his religious freedom to use
cannabis as a holy anointing oil. The court held that the plaintiff had failed
to state a valid facial challenge under RFRA, because he failed to allege that
the restriction on marijuana was impermissible in all of its applications.101
These cases demonstrate that RFRA is not a blank check. Courts do not
automatically accept all allegations of religious belief as “sincere,” and they
can easily weed out frivolous claims.102
3. Eagle Feathers
If anything, courts may be underenforcing RFRA for religious minorities.103 An example from our data set involves Native American use of eagle
feathers. Aside from the contraception mandate cases, these are the most
common RFRA cases, with 3 decisions in the last 5 years (and 7 in the last
10).104 In the last five years, every challenge was rejected. In the previous
five years, only two challenges were successful, and one of those two was
reversed on appeal.105
Eagle feathers play an important role in Native American religious practices. But under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act,106 it is illegal to
kill eagles or possess eagle feathers or parts without a permit. Permits are
99

See id. at 719.
594 F. App’x 497.
101
Id. at 501.
102
Cf. Christopher C. Lund, Keeping Hobby Lobby in Perspective, in THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 285 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, & Zoë Robinson eds., Oxford University Press 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2842680 (“There are
still few examples of RFRA and state RFRAs giving controversial exemptions. Of course,
religious people sometimes make tendentious claims, particularly prisoners. But those
claims do not win. At every turn, the tendency has been toward underenforcement not
overenforcement”).
103
Id.; cf. Barclay & Rienzi, supra note 4 (finding support for the proposition that religious exemptions, including RFRA, are underenforced compared to exemptions under other expressive rights in the First Amendment).
104
See Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Sch., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla. 2016);
United States v. Aguilar. 527 F. App’x 808 (10th Cir. 2013); N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe,
925 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Wyo. 2012); United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (D.
Utah 2009), rev’d, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Hardman, 622 F. Supp.
2d 1129 (D. Utah 2009); United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
105
Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308, rev'd, 638 F.3d 1274; Hardman, 622 F. Supp. 2d
1129.
106
16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2016).
100
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available for museums, scientists, zoos, farmers, and a wide variety of other
interests—such as power companies and airports, which kill hundreds of
eagles every year.107 Permits are also available for Native American religious use—but only to members of “federally recognized tribes.”108 Because gaining federal recognition is very difficult,109 and many tribes never
gain it, there are currently thousands of Native Americans who are forever
prohibited from possessing even a single eagle feather.
The federal government’s restrictions on eagle feathers have led to
many conflicts. In the leading Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Wilgus,110
a non-Native American who had practiced a Native American religion for
many years was pulled over for speeding, and the officer searched his car
for drugs.111 Although no drugs were found, the officer did find eagle feathers—resulting in criminal charges and a conviction.112 On appeal, the government conceded that the criminal ban on possession of eagle feathers imposed a “substantial burden” on the defendant’s religious exercise.113 This
meant that the government was required to satisfy strict scrutiny. But the
Tenth Circuit held that the government satisfied strict scrutiny, because the
supply of eagle feathers is limited and the government has a compelling interest in “providing for the religious needs of members of federallyrecognized tribes.”114 Since the decision in Wilgus, there have been three
more RFRA cases involving the use of eagle feathers—all unsuccessful.115
But the result in Wilgus is questionable. Perhaps due to inadequate
briefing, the decision rests on the faulty premise that there is only one legitimate source of eagle feathers—the National Eagle Feather Repository—
and that the repository has an extremely limited supply of eagle feathers.116
107
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 2014)
(quoting 16 U.S.C. § 668(a)); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Preliminary Injunction at 17–
22, McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Jewell, No. 7-60 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2015)
http://s3.amazonaws.com/becketpdf/McAllen-PI-Motion-file-stamped.pdf (describing the
eagle permits issued for non-religious uses).
108
50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a)(5) (Federally Recognized Tribal List Act of 1994) (2017).
109
See id. Part 22; 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (establishing seven “mandatory criteria” with 34
sub-factors or categories of evidence to gain federal recognition status).
110
638 F.3d 1274.
111
Id. at 1280.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 1290.
115
N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Wyo. 2012) (upholding restriction on permit); Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Sch., 157 F. Supp. 3d 1159 (N.D. Okla.
2016) (rejecting free speech and free exercise claims); United States v. Aguilar, 527 Fed.
App’x 808 (10th Cir. 2013) (rejecting RFRA defense to prosecution).
116
Compare 638 F,3d at 1291 (concluding that there is “no significant untapped
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On this view, eagle feathers are a “zero-sum game”: every feather obtained
by someone who is not a member of a federally recognized tribe is taken
away from a member of a federally recognized tribe.117 But in fact, there are
many ways to obtain eagle feathers beyond the repository. There are federal
permits to take live eagles;118 there are permits for operating eagle aviaries,
which supply a steady stream of molted feathers;119 and there are millions
of feathers naturally molted every year in zoos and in the wild, which could
be picked up and used for religious ceremonies if not for the federal prohibition.120 Beyond that, the court erred by focusing only on permits for Native American religious use. There are also permits for museums, scientists,
zoos, airports, falconers, farmers, power companies, and many others.121 So
the regulation of eagle feathers is not a zero-sum game between two different groups of Native Americans; it is a multi-faceted game that often prefers
commercial killing of eagles to the peaceful Native American religious use
of feathers. And it is hard to see how the government has a compelling interest in prohibiting a Native American from possessing even a single feather—without ever killing an eagle—when it simultaneously allows power
companies to kill hundreds of eagles for nonreligious reasons every year.122
Not surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in McAllen Grace
Brethren Church v. Salazar123 parts ways with Wilgus. In McAllen, an undercover federal agent raided a Native American powwow and confiscated
feathers from a nationally renowned feather dancer who had used the feathers for many decades.124 Because the dancer was not a member of a federalsources of birds not already being sent to the [National Eagle Feather] Repository”), with
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v, Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 479 (5th Cir. 2014) (detailing
alternative sources to the National Eagle Feather Repository for obtaining eagle feathers,
including zoos, and tribal maintained eagle aviaries).
117
638 F,3d at 1293.
118
16 U.S.C. § 668a; 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2016).
119
See generally U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. FORM 3–
200-78 (2013), available at http://www.fws.gov/forms/3-200-78.pdf.
120
Mem. from the U.S. Attorney General to the Assistant Attorney General, Environment and National Resources Division, All U.S. Attorneys, and Director, Executive Office
for
U.S.
Attorneys
(Oct.
12
2012),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2012/10/22/ef-policy.pdf
(discussing
the possession or use of eagle feathers or other parts for tribal, cultural, and religious purposes).
121
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Preliminary Injunction at 17–22, McAllen Grace
Brethren Church v. Jewell, No. 7-60 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2015)
http://s3.amazonaws.com/becketpdf/McAllen-PI-Motion-file-stamped.pdf (describing the
eagle permits issued for non-religious uses).
122
Id. at 20–22.
123
764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014).
124
McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Jewell, BECKET (Aug. 8, 2017),
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ly recognized tribe, he was in violation of the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. But the Fifth Circuit, citing Hobby Lobby, held that the government failed to satisfy strict scrutiny under RFRA. The court reasoned
that the limited supply of feathers at the repository was a problem “of the
government’s own making,” because the government ran an “inefficient”
system.125 And the court held that the government had failed to show that
“other avenues” of obtaining feathers were infeasible.126 In the wake of
McAllen, the federal government entered a historic settlement agreement
with the plaintiff and over 400 other Native Americans who are not members of federally recognized tribes, guaranteeing their right to possess feathers and access the repository.127 This settlement makes the result in Wilgus
even harder to defend and may prompt additional litigation in the Tenth
Circuit.
E. Free Exercise
When a RFRA claim is unavailable, litigants must often rely on the Free
Exercise Clause. There were two successful free exercise decisions. One
involved a challenge to Utah’s bigamy statute by a polygamist family featured on the reality show “Sister Wives.”128 The district court held that the
statute, as applied to religious cohabitation, was not neutral toward religion
and was not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.129 But
the Tenth Circuit vacated that decision and ordered the case to be dismissed
as moot, because the government adopted a new enforcement policy eliminating any credible threat of prosecution.130
The other successful free exercise decision involved a novel dispute between two Native American tribes over a request to kill bald eagles.131 The
Northern Arapaho Tribe applied to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to
http://www.becketlaw.org/case/mcallen-grace-brethren-church-v-jewell/#caseDetail.
125
764 F.3d at 479.
126
Id.
127
Press Release, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty Native Americans Win, Feds
Flee Feather Fight: Government Surrenders Sacred Feathers Admits Undercover Powwow
Raid Was Illegal (June 14, 2016), http://www.becketlaw.org/media/native-americans-winfeds-flee-feather-fight/; Settlement Agreement, McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Jewell,
No.
7:07-cv-060
(S.D.
Tex.
June
13,
2016),
available
at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/becketpdf/Exhibit-1-Settlement-Agreement-file-stamped.pdf.
Co-author Goodrich was counsel for the plaintiffs in McAllen.
128
Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013), vacated as moot, 822
F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016).
129
947 F. Supp. 2d. at 1209–22.
130
822 F.3d 1151.
131
N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1160 (D. Wyo. 2015).
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take two bald eagles for religious purposes from the Wind River Reservation, where the tribe has lived for many years.132 But the Eastern Shoshone
Tribe also lives on the Wind River Reservation, and they claimed that
“[a]llowing an enemy tribe the right to kill [thei]r sacred eagles” would violate their religious beliefs.133 The federal government tried to reach a compromise that would satisfy the religious beliefs of both tribes: it granted a
permit allowing the Northern Arapaho Tribe to take two bald eagles outside
the reservation.134 But the Northern Arapaho Tribe sued under RFRA and
the Free Exercise Clause, claiming that their religious beliefs required them
to take the eagles from within the reservation.135
The district court rejected the RFRA claim at an early stage of the case,
relying on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Wilgus.136 But then, in a highly
unusual twist, it ruled in the tribe’s favor under the Free Exercise Clause,
citing the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in Hobby Lobby and Holt,
and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McAllen.137 The court held that the government’s action was “facially discriminatory because [it] burdened the
Northern Arapaho Tribe’s culture and religion based on the cultural or religious objection of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe.”138 And it held that the action failed strict scrutiny, because “[t]he asserted harm to the culture and
religion of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe . . . is miniscule.”139 The court did
not explain why it chose to resolve the case on free exercise grounds, rather
than revisiting its RFRA decision in light of intervening precedent. That
makes this one of the very rare cases to rule against a RFRA claim on the
merits but in favor of a free exercise claim based on the same facts.140
This decision is likely best understood as a RFRA decision in free exercise clothing. Although the court said it was avoiding RFRA’s “substantial
burden” inquiry,141 it based its decision primarily on Hobby Lobby and Holt,
which are RFRA and RLUIPA cases, respectively—not free exercise cases.
And the court’s free exercise analysis focused on the fact that the govern132

Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1166.
134
Id. at 1164.
135
Id. at 1167.
136
N. Arapaho Tribe v. Ashe, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1216–18 (D. Wyo. 2012) (discussing Wilgus).
137
92 F. Supp. 3d at 1180–90.
138
Id. at 1179.
139
Id. at 1187.
140
The only similar cases we are aware of are Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540,
1543 n.2 (D. Neb. 1996) and Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, Pa., 35 F.3d 846, 849-50 (3d
Cir. 1994).
141
92 F. Supp. 3d at 1182 (“[The Court] need not consider whether Defendants’ final
agency action placed a substantial burden on Plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion.”)
133
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ment had “burdened the Northern Arapaho Tribe’s culture and religion”142—which sounds more like an analysis of a RFRA claim than a free
exercise claim.
A final takeaway on free exercise claims is that they are rare and hard to
win. Of the 23 Free Exercise claims raised, the courts reached the merits in
only 10.143 Of the 10 decisions where the court addressed the merits, plaintiffs were successful only twice. Even then, one of the two was vacated as
moot, and the other is better viewed as a RFRA claim. The paucity of successful free exercise claims is probably explained in part by the fact that
RFRA provides a broad statutory remedy that must be decided before any
free exercise claim when the federal government is the defendant, in part by
the fact that free exercise claims involve difficult threshold questions about
when a law is “neutral” or “generally applicable,” and in part by the fact
that courts remain hesitant to apply the Free Exercise Clause vigorously in
the wake of Employment Division v. Smith.144
F. Establishment Clause
There were three successful Establishment Clause decisions in two different cases—one involving an unusual challenge to a sharia ban,145 and the
other involving a run-of-the-mill challenge to a Ten Commandments display.146
The sharia ban was a proposed constitutional amendment in Oklahoma.
The amendment would have prohibited Oklahoma courts from relying on
“the legal precepts of other nations or cultures,” “[s]pecifically, . . . international law or Sharia Law.”147 So, for example, if a private arbitration
142

Id. at 1179 (emphasis added).
This is in part because free exercise claims are often brought in conjunction with
RFRA claims (10 times in our data set), and if a RFRA claim is successful, the court typically does not reach the free exercise claim. Free exercise claims were also brought in conjunction with claims under the Establishment Clause (11 times), Free Speech Clause (11
times), Equal Protection Clause (6 times), and freedom of association (4 times).
144
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See, e.g., Amy Adamczyk, John Wibraniec, & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the Courts: Documenting the Effects of
Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 237, 250 tbl. 1 (2004) (finding that the success rate
of free exercise claims dropped from 39.5% to 28.4% after Smith, and that the number of
claims dropped from 310 decided in the nine-and-a-quarter years before the decision to 38
in the three-and-a-half years after); but see Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally
Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2016).
145
Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (W.D. Okla. 2013).
146
Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 36 F. Supp. 3d 1233 (D.N.M. 2014), aff’d, 841 F.3d
848 (10th Cir. 2016).
147
966 F. Supp. 2d at 1200–01.
143
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agreement between Muslims incorporated elements of Islamic law, it could
not be enforced in court; but if a private arbitration agreement between
Christians or Jews incorporated elements of biblical or Jewish law, it
could.148
The amendment was challenged by several Muslims under both the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Following the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning from an earlier decision in the case,149 the district court resolved the
case by applying what it called the “Larson test” under the Establishment
Clause.150 Under this test, the amendment was subject to strict scrutiny because it made “‘explicit and deliberate distinctions’ among religions.”151
And the court held that the amendment failed strict scrutiny because the
state failed to identify “any actual problem the challenged amendment
seeks to solve.”152 Having decided that the amendment violated the Establishment Clause, the court declined to address the merits of the claim under
the Free Exercise Clause.153
This decision is interesting not for the result—which is likely correct—
but for its reliance on the Establishment Clause rather than the Free Exercise Clause. By singling out “Sharia Law,” the text of the amendment singled out one religion, Islam, for unfavorable treatment. Such singling out is
ordinarily treated as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.154 Yet the court
relied on the Establishment Clause. Why?
148

See Luke W. Goodrich, Sharia Across the Pond, THE GUARDIAN (JULY 6, 2009,
5:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/06/sharia-courtsus-islam.
149
Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
150
966 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 1203–04.
153
Id. at 1202 n.1.
154
See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2019, 2024 (2017) (“[T]arget[ing] the religious for special disabilities based on their religious status” is a violation of “the Free Exercise Clause.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 534, 541–42 (1993) (stating that an “attempt to disfavor [a] religion” violates the Free
Exercise Clause, while “governmental efforts to benefit religion or particular religions”
typically violate the Establishment Clause); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (Souter, J., plurality opinion) (applying Establishment Clause
where religious group was vested with civic power but noting that if the group had instead
been “denied” “the rights of citizens simply because of [its] religious affiliations,” that
would be a “free exercise” case); see also Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of
Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1800 (2006) (When “restrictions on minority faiths are [not]
part of any effort to establish some other religion, . . . such restrictions are . . . treated as a
free exercise issue.”).
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There are several possible reasons. First, it is currently easier to establish standing to sue under the Establishment Clause than under other provisions of the Constitution.155 Courts often allow plaintiffs to bring Establishment Clause claims based on nothing more than “offensive contact”
with a government policy or symbol with which they disagree.156 Thus, if
there were any doubts about the plaintiffs’ standing in Awad, that would
push the court toward relying on the Establishment Clause.
Second, because the Establishment Clause is a structural restraint on
government power, remedies for a violation of the Establishment Clause
tend to be broader than for a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.157 If a
government action violates the Establishment Clause, it will often be struck
down in its entirety. But if an action violates the Free Exercise Clause, the
remedy may be merely an injunction protecting the specific religious claimant.158
Third, since the Supreme Court narrowed the application of the Free
Exercise Clause in Smith,159 lower courts have been hesitant to invalidate
government actions under the Free Exercise Clause.160 By contrast, the legal
standards under the Establishment Clause are notoriously malleable,161
making the Establishment Clause a more flexible vehicle for resolving contested claims.
Interestingly, this dynamic in Awad arose again in litigation over Executive Order No. 13780—commonly known as President Trump’s “travel
ban”—which suspended entry to the United States by certain foreign nationals from six Muslim-majority countries.162 In Trump v. International
155

See Brief Amicus Curiae of The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of
Petitioners, Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010) (No. 08-472) (arguing that the standing
in Establishment Clause cases should be similar to standing in Equal Protection Clause
cases).
156
See id. (collecting examples).
157
See Brief Amicus Curiae of The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of
Neither Party, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, Nos. 16-1436, 16-1540 (U.S.
August 17, 2017) [hereinafter Becket IRAP Amicus Brief].
158
See id.
159
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
160
See supra note 144.
161
See, e.g., Doe v. Elmbrook School District, 687 F.3d 840, 869–77 (Easterbook, J. &
Posner, C.J., dissenting from en banc decision) (calling Lemon and “no endorsement” test
“hopelessly open-ended”); Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools—An Update, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 5 (1987); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1986).
162
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017). The travel ban has
since been modified by a Presidential Proclamation, which includes new restrictions on
Venezuela, North Korea, and Chad, and eliminates restriction on Sudan. See Presidential
Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry
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Refugee Assistance Project (“IRAP”), the plaintiffs argued that the Executive Order was in fact a “Muslim ban” that singled out Muslims for disfavored treatment.163 But the plaintiffs did not bring a claim under the Free
Exercise Clause; instead, they relied on the Establishment Clause.164 This is
likely for the same reasons described above: the Establishment Clause may
have helped them skirt difficult questions of standing; the Establishment
Clause may have allowed them to strike down the Executive Order in its
entirety, rather than obtain an injunction limited to the plaintiffs; and some
courts may have been more receptive to a claim under the Establishment
Clause than under the Free Exercise Clause.
But the plaintiffs in IRAP also attempted to go one significant step beyond Awad. In Awad, the court applied the “Larson test,” which requires
strict scrutiny whenever a law discriminates among religions.165 But in
IRAP, the plaintiffs invoked the “Lemon test,” which invalidates a law automatically if it has a religious purpose.166 In other words, the government
gets no opportunity to satisfy strict scrutiny. That was particularly important
in IRAP, because the government claimed that the Executive Order was justified by weighty national security interests. But because the lower courts
applied the Lemon test, they enjoined the Executive Order without ever
weighing the government’s alleged interest.167
Both Awad and IRAP were wrong to view the challenged laws exclusively through the lens of the Establishment Clause. That does not mean
that they reached the wrong result. But a claim that the government is targeting one religious group for disfavor—rather than giving other religious
groups preferential treatment—is most naturally viewed through the lens of
the Free Exercise Clause.168 The Free Exercise Clause allows the courts to
consider the concrete harms to the specific plaintiffs.169 It gives the courts
well-established tools to ferret out hostility toward religion, rather than relying on the subjective Lemon test.170 It allows the courts to craft a remedy
Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Sep. 24, 2017).
163
See Brief in Opposition, Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, No.
16-1436 (U.S. June 12, 2017).
164
See id.
165
Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1203 (W.D. Okla. 2013).
166
See id. (despite invoking the Lemon test, plaintiffs never mention or cite Lemon).
167
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), as amended
(May 31, 2017), as amended (June 15, 2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
168
See Becket IRAP Amicus Brief, supra note 157.
169
See id. at 28–31.
170
See id. at 21–25 (Lukumi offers seven ways that a plaintiff can prove that a law is
not neutral or generally applicable with respect to religion: (1) facially targeting religion;
(2) resulting in a religious gerrymander in its real operation; (3) failing to apply to analogous secular conduct; (4) giving the government open-ended discretion to make individual-
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that addresses specific harms. And it allows the courts to balance competing
governmental interests.171
The other successful Establishment Clause decision in our data set involved a challenge to a Ten Commandments display. In Felix, a city in New
Mexico installed a Ten Commandments monument—along with monuments to the Gettysburg Address, Declaration of Independence, and Bill of
Rights—on the City Hall Lawn.172 City residents challenged the Ten Commandments monument as a violation of the Establishment Clause, and the
Tenth Circuit agreed.173 Applying the Lemon test, the Tenth Circuit held
that the text of the monument (taken from the King James Bible), the location of the monument in front of city hall, the installation of the monument
at a religious ceremony, and the fact that the monument immediately
prompted litigation all contributed to a finding that the government had
“endorsed” religion.174 This “taint of [government] endorsement” was not
cured by the fact that the monument was created and donated by a private
party, was accompanied by several secular monuments, and was accompanied by a sign disclaiming any government endorsement of religion.175
The result in Felix is not uncommon. Lower courts have struggled for
years to apply the Lemon test in any consistent and objective fashion. That
test has been widely criticized by the lower courts,176 commentators,177 and
ized exemptions; (5) being selectively enforced; (6) having its historical background show
that the lawmaker’s purpose was to discriminate based on religion; and (7) discriminating
between religions).
171
See id. at 25–28. It is also better to understand Larson as a case arising under both
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The plaintiffs in Larson invoked both clauses. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 233 (1982). So did the Supreme Court, stating that
“[t]h[e] constitutional prohibition of denominational preferences is inextricably connected
with the continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause.” Id. at 245. And the Court applied
strict scrutiny. Id. at 246. Thus, at least one decision in the Tenth Circuit has noted that
Larson is supported by both clauses. Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245,
1257–58 (10th Cir. 2008) (McConnell, J.) (“[D]iscrimination [among religions] is forbidden by the Free Exercise Clause as well. [citing Larson] . . . So while the Establishment
Clause frames much of our inquiry, the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause and Equal
Protection Clause proceed along similar lines.”).
172
Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 841 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 2016).
173
Id. at 851.
174
Id. at 857–59.
175
Id. at 860–64.
176
See, e.g., Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869–78 (7th Cir. 2012)
(Easterbook, J. & Posner, J., dissenting from en banc decision) (calling Lemon and “no
endorsement” test “hopelessly open-ended”); Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 574
F.3d 1235, 1235 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) (Kelly, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (noting that “[w]hether Lemon . . . and its progeny actually create discernable ‘tests,’
rather than a mere ad hoc patchwork, is debatable” and describing the “judicial morass re-
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Supreme Court Justices alike178 as largely subjective, allowing courts to
reach virtually any result. Thus, it would have been just as easy to write an
opinion saying that the Ten Commandments monument did not endorse religion because it was donated by a private party, accompanied by secular
monuments, and attended by a disclaimer.179
The more interesting aspect of Felix is the dissent from denial of rehearing en banc by Judges Kelly and Tymkovich, who proposed an alternative
method of resolving Establishment Clause cases.180 They noted that the Supreme Court’s two most recent Establishment Clause decisions have moved
sulting from the Supreme Court's opinions”); Card v. Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“Confounded by the ten individual opinions in [McCreary and Van Orden] . . .
courts have described the current state of the law as both ‘Establishment Clause purgatory’
and ‘Limbo’” (citation omitted)); id., at 1023–1024 (Fernandez, J., concurring) (applauding
the majority’s “heroic attempt to create a new world of useful principle out of the Supreme
Court’s dark materials” and lamenting the “still stalking Lemon test and the other tests and
factors, which have floated to the top of this chaotic ocean from time to time,” as “so indefinite and unhelpful that Establishment Clause jurisprudence has not become more fathomable” (footnote omitted)).
177
See, e.g., Choper, supra note 161; McConnell, supra note 161.
178
See, e.g., Elmbrook Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 134 S. Ct. 2283, 2284 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (calling the endorsement test “antiquated”); Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 567 U.S. 944, 944 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (“Establishment Clause jurisprudence is undoubtedly in need of clarity”); Utah
Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 13-21 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Establishment Clause jurisprudence [is] in shambles,”
“nebulous,” “erratic,” “no principled basis,” “Establishment Clause purgatory,” “impenetrable,” “ad hoc patchwork,” “limbo,” “incapable of consistent application,” “our mess,”
“little more than intuition and a tape measure,”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (comparing the Lemon
test to a “ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried”).; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644
(1992) (Scalia, J., joined by White, J. and Thomas, J., dissenting); Allegheny Cty. v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655–57 (1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107–13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 90–91 (White,
J., dissenting).
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has treated the Lemon factors as “no more than
helpful signposts,” if it has applied them at all. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686
(2005) (plurality); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (not applying Lemon); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (same); Good News Club
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (same).
179
See, e.g., Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“When everything matters, when nothing is dispositive, when
we must juggle incommensurable factors, a judge can do little but announce his gestalt.”).
180
Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2017) (dissent from denial of
rehearing en banc).
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away from the subjective Lemon test and have instead embraced a historical
approach.181 Specifically, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, which involved a
challenge to legislative prayer, the Court held that “the Establishment
Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and understandings.’”182 And in Van Orden v. Perry, which involved a Ten Commandments monument, the Supreme Court specifically avoided relying on
Lemon and instead said that its analysis was “driven both by the nature of
the monument and by our Nation’s history.”183
To flesh out this historical approach, Judges Kelly and Tymkovich drew
on the scholarship of former Tenth Circuit judge Michael McConnell, who
has written that an “establishment” at the time of the founding consisted of
several recognized features: “(1) [state] control over doctrine, governance,
and personnel of the church; (2) compulsory church attendance; (3) financial support; (4) prohibitions on worship in dissenting churches; (5) use of
church institutions for public functions; and (6) restriction of political participation to members of the established church.”184 Because the City’s actions in Felix “met none of the traditional elements of . . . the original public
meaning of ‘establishment,’” Judges Kelly and Tymkovich concluded that
the City’s actions should not be construed as an establishment of religion.185
This type of historical analysis seems likely to become the prevailing
method of resolving Establishment Clause claims. The Lemon test is now
on its last legs;186 it has been criticized by a majority of recent Justices, and
the Court has studiously avoided applying it in recent cases.187 The Court
has increasingly relied on a historical approach to interpret the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the Second,188 Fourth,189 and Sixth190
181

Id. at 1219.
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014).
183
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion); see also id. at
699–700 (Breyer, J., concurring); Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. Galloway: The Establishment Clause and the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 71 (2014).
184
847 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2105, 2131 (2003)).
185
Id. at 1221; see also Rassbach, supra note 183, at 92 (proposing a similar approach).
186
Rassbach, supra note 183, at 90.
187
See supra note 178.
188
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–97 (2008) (examining the meaning of the Second Amendment “[a]t the time of the founding”).
189
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 & n.3 (2012) (examining the “original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment,” because “we must assur[e] preservation of that degree
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted”).
190
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000) (examining “the practice of
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Amendments, as well as the First Amendment itself.191 Its most recent Establishment Clause case held that “the Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and understandings.’”192 Thus, it
seems like only a matter of time before the Court makes clear that this sort
of historical approach should guide interpretation of the Establishment
Clause.
This will be a welcome development. A historical approach will place
the interpretation of the Establishment Clause on a far more objective basis
than under the Lemon test. It will connect the interpretation of the Establishment Clause to the motivating concerns of the founders—namely, coercion and control of religion.193 And it will reduce unnecessary division over
many of the less significant matters of religious expression that have come
to fill the courts’ Establishment Clause docket.194
G. Title VII
In Title VII cases, there were five favorable decisions. All five were
“partial” victories—where the plaintiff merely survived a motion to dismiss
or motion for summary judgment. Three of the five involved EEOC enforcement actions to protect Muslims.195 One involved a religious discrimination claim by Mormons—the only case in our data set that was brought
by Mormon plaintiffs.196 The last case involved an employee allegedly fired
by the Kansas government for not attending church.197
It seems noteworthy that three of the five successful Title VII decisions
criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed during the years surrounding our Nation's founding”); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (examining “the historical background of the [Confrontation] Clause to understand its meaning”).
191
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
702 (2012) (applying historical analysis to determine the existence and scope of the First
Amendment ministerial exception).
192
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014).
193
See McConnell, supra note 184, at 2131; Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The
Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1986).
194
Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting that Establishment Clause cases often “require[e] scrutiny
more commonly associated with interior decorators than with the judiciary”).
195
EEOC v. 704 HTL Operating, LLC, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D.N.M 2013); EEOC v.
JBS USA, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Colo. 2015); EEOC v. Jetstream Ground Servs.,
Inc., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (D. Colo. 2015).
196
Hunt v. Cent. Consol. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D.N.M. 2013).
197
Canfield v. Office of the Sec’y of State for Kan., 209 F. Supp. 3d 1219 (D. Kan.
2016). In a later decision in that case, the jury rejected the employee’s religious discrimination
claim,
resulting
in
a
loss
for
the
religious
claimant.
See
http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2017/08/fired-employee-loses-religious.html.
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involved Muslims, given that Muslims constitute less than 1% of the Tenth
Circuit population. Surveying lower federal courts between 1996–2005,
Sisk and Heise found that the most common religious liberty claims brought
by Muslims, aside from prisoner claims, were employment discrimination
cases against the federal government.198 However, they also found that
Muslim claimants were nearly twice as likely to lose than non-Muslim
claimants.199 But unlike Sisk and Heise, our data set includes cases brought
against private employers. And all three successful Muslim claims involved
EEOC enforcement actions. Thus, our findings may speak less to the overall
success rates of Muslim claimants and more to the possibility of increased
enforcement of Title VII by EEOC on behalf of Muslims.200
H. Prisoner and Asylum Cases
For most of our analysis, we have excluded claims brought by prisoners
and asylum seekers. But a few more observations on those claims are in order.
Of the 39 prisoner decisions in our data set, 15 (38%) were decided on
purely procedural grounds. This is double the rate of purely procedural decisions in non-prisoner and non-asylum cases (19%). But that is not surprising, given that 87% of prisoner cases were pro se.
Of the 24 decisions that addressed the merits, 6 were successful201—
198

Heise & Sisk, Muslims and Religious Liberty, supra note 4, at 249.
Id.
200
In the wake of 9/11, “the EEOC saw a 250% increase in the number of religionbased discrimination charges involving Muslims,” and although the uptick related to 9/11
decreased, the EEOC continues to see an increase in charges involving religious discrimination against Muslims. U.S. EEOC, What You Should Know about the EEOC and Religious and National Origin Discrimination Involving the Muslim, Sikh, Arab, Middle Eastern
and
South
Asian
Communities,
https://www.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/wysk/religion_national_origin_9-11.cfm (last visited Aug. 21, 2017). The EEOC reports that it has filed “nearly 90 lawsuits alleging religious
and national origin discrimination involving the Muslim, Sikh, Arab, Middle Eastern and
South Asian communities.” Id. Specifically, from 2009 until late October 2015, there were
54 cases in which the EEOC brought religious accommodation lawsuits on behalf of employees. Eugene Volokh, The EEOC, religious accommodation claims, and Muslims,
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 21, 2016). Of those, 14 (26%) were brought on
behalf of Muslim employees, 6 (11%) on behalf of Seventh-day Adventists, 6 (11%) on
behalf of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and 1 (2%) on behalf of a class including both Muslims and
non-Muslims. Id. The rest were brought on behalf of members of various other religious
groups. Id.
201
See Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA); Robertson v.
Biby, 647 F. App’x 893 (10th Cir. 2016) (RLUIPA); Williams v. Wilkinson, 645 F. App’x
692 (10th Cir. 2016) (RLUIPA and free exercise); Tennyson v. Carpenter, 558 F. App’x
199
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producing a success rate of 25%. Like the Title VII cases, all of the successful decisions involved “partial” success—i.e., rulings that the plaintiff survived summary judgment or a motion to dismiss. The 6 successful decisions
involved 5 RLUIPA claims, 3 free exercise claims, and 1 equal protection
claim. (There are more successful claims than decisions, because some successful decisions involved multiple successful claims.)
The 25% success rate for prisoner decisions is surprisingly high. It is
more than half the success rate of non-prisoner and non-asylum decisions
(42%), and it approaches the success rate in those cases when the contraception mandate decisions are excluded (32%). This is especially surprising
given that 87% of prisoner decisions involved pro se plaintiffs (including 5
of 6 successful decisions), compared with only 10% of non-prisoner and
non-asylum decisions.
But two factors should temper this surprise. First, none of the 6 successful decisions involved complete success; they were merely rulings that the
plaintiff survived summary judgment or a motion to dismiss. Second, 37 of
the 39 prisoner decisions came from the Tenth Circuit, while only 2 came
from district courts.202 That is because our data set excludes unreported district court decisions, and district courts almost always resolve pro se prisoner cases via unreported decisions. Thus, our data set excludes a substantial
number of unsuccessful prisoner decisions, which would significantly reduce the success rate. That said, an interesting line of future research would
be to develop a data set that enables comparison of the success rates of prisoner claims compared with other types of religious freedom claims. Particularly since the Supreme Court’s decision in Holt203—ruling unanimously in
favor of a Muslim prisoner’s RLUIPA claim—the success rates in prisoner
cases may rise.
Of the 20 asylum decisions, only 1 resulted in even partial success—a
remand to the BIA to consider a claim it had failed to address.204 This is
likely due to the high level of deference given to the BIA.205
813 (10th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA, free exercise, and equal protection); Marshall v. Wyo.
Dep’t of Corrections, 592 F. App’x 713 (10th Cir. 2014) (free exercise); McKinley v.
Maddox, 493 F. App’x 928 (10th Cir. 2012) (free exercise).
202
See Woodstock v. Shaffer, 169 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (D. Colo. 2016) (claim survived
defendant’s motion for summary judgment); Pfeil v. Lampert, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (D.
Wyo. 2014) (plaintiff’s preliminary injunction denied on RLUIPA and free exercise
claims).
203
Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015).
204
Li v. Holder, 607 F. App’x 818, 825 (10th Cir. 2015) (remanding to the BIA to consider claim based on fear of future religious persecution).
205
See Xue v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017) (detailing deferential
standard of review).

48

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

I. Cases Involving a Dissent
Lastly, in addition to considering successful religious liberty claims, we
wanted to explore the decisions that were most divisive—namely, those that
generated dissent.
Of the 23 Tenth Circuit decisions in non-prisoner non-asylum cases, 5
(22%) involved at least one dissent.206 This rate of dissent is almost ten
times higher than the rate of dissent in Tenth Circuit cases generally
(2.4%)207—suggesting that religious liberty claims proved to be difficult.
However, this number is also affected by the spate of contraception mandate cases, which generated 3 of the 5 dissents.208 Absent the contraception
mandate cases, the rate of dissent was more modest but still quadruple the
average—at 10%.
The five decisions involving dissents came in four cases. Three of these
we have already discussed: Felix (Ten Commandments),209 Hobby Lobby
(contraception mandate),210 and Little Sisters of the Poor (contraception
mandate).211 The fourth was EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,
which involved a Title VII employment discrimination claim brought by a
Muslim job applicant.212
Notably, three of these four cases (Little Sisters of the Poor, Hobby
Lobby, and Abercrombie) were eventually heard on the merits by the Supreme Court.213 All three were resolved in favor of the religious claimant—
206

Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2017) (dissent from denial of
rehearing en banc); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir.
2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc);
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015)
(panel decision); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 799 F.3d 1315
(10th Cir. 2015) (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc).
207
To calculate this rate, we first searched all Tenth Circuit decisions for adv: DA(aft
02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017), yielding 6,131 cases. We then searched all Tenth Circuit
decisions for adv: DA(aft 02-24-2012 & bef 02-25-2017) & DIS(dissent!), yielding 148
cases. 148/6,131=0.024 or 2.4%.
208
See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d 1114 (en banc); Little Sisters of the Poor, 794 F.3d
1151 (panel decision); Little Sisters of the Poor, 799 F.3d 1315 (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc).
209
Felix, 847 F.3d 1214 (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc).
210
Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d 1114 (en banc).
211
Little Sisters of the Poor, 794 F.3d 1151 (panel decision); Little Sisters of the Poor,
799 F.3d 1315 (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc).
212
731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013).
213
Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Little Sisters of the Poor); Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2028 (2015).
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with the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Hobby Lobby affirmed, its ruling in Abercrombie reversed, and its ruling in Little Sisters of the Poor vacated.
Ultimately, despite the small sample size, these results suggest that religious liberty cases tend to present some of the more difficult and divisive
issues confronting the federal courts.
CONCLUSION
It is no secret that religious liberty can be a divisive issue. Precisely because of that, discussions about the issue should be informed by concrete
data. Although it can be tempting to build a narrative about religious liberty
based on a small number of high profile cases—such as Hobby Lobby and
Little Sisters of the Poor—those cases are not the whole story. The whole
story is more complex—and more interesting. It is a story of prisoners and
asylum seekers, employees and Ten Commandments monuments, Muslims
and nonbelievers. It is a story of a relatively small number of cases, brought
predominantly on behalf of non-Christian religious minorities, meeting limited success.
Our empirical study raises a number of interesting questions. For example, why are there so few cases? Is it because our society already does a
good job of protecting religious liberty? Or is it because certain types of religious claims are so difficult to win? Similarly, why are non-Christian religious minorities bringing a disproportionate share of cases? Are they more
likely to sue? Or are they more likely to suffer a violation of their religious
liberty? And finally, what caused the anomalous spate of cases challenging
the contraception mandate? Was it a new kind of litigiousness by Christians? Or was it a new kind of overreach by the federal government?
Our study does not answer these questions. But it does place them in a
more informed context. It suggests that Hobby Lobby, while important, was
not a turning point in religious liberty litigation. It has not prompted a flood
of new litigation by Christians or for-profit corporations. If anything, its
main effect has been to provide more protection for religious minorities like
the Native Americans who won the right to use eagle feathers in McAllen,
or the Muslim prisoner who won the right to grow a beard in Holt. These
religious minorities were the main religious liberty claimants before Hobby
Lobby, and they remain the main religious liberty claimants afterwards.
Ironically, then, the main beneficiaries of the win for Christian claimants in
Hobby Lobby may be non-Christian religious minorities.

